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Abstract 
School district officials are responsible for the safety of large populations of 
students and staff. Yet, few have meteorological training to accurately interpret severe 
weather information to make the best decisions during tornado warnings, and little 
research has focused on further understanding the context in which these groups make 
weather sensitive decisions. Including the needs and perspectives of groups such as 
school district officials into weather product development is necessary in order to create 
the most valuable and useful products in the future. Eleven participants with various 
titles from six school districts in central and eastern U.S. were interviewed in the spring 
and summer of 2011. Semi-structured interviews were used to address four main 
questions: 1) what is the K-12 public school official's time line of decision making and 
action implementation before, during, and after tornado warnings? 2) what sources of 
weather information do key decision makers in K-12 public schools access and why? 3) 
what are the non-weather factors that influence how decisions are made?, and 4) what 
types of weather infom1ation might improve operations for K-12 public schools, and 
how might longer lead times change the decision making process? Interviews were 
coded according to predete1mined themes and analyzed. 
Preparations for tornado warnings, such as conducting drills, educating the 
students, and crafting severe weather plans, occmTed dw-ing the majority of the year 
when there was no severe weather. Additionally, much of the action taken, most notably 
communicating with staff, students, and parents, occurs throughout several phases 
beginning hours before the severe weather was approaching to when the tornado 
warning has passed. "Lead time" in the minds of these decision maker thus began 
X 
several hours before the tornado warning was issued, emphasizing the need to step away 
from the traditional mindset that a tornado warning lead time is only minutes before a 
tornado occurs. These decision makers used sources similar to what the general public 
is known to use, including NOAA websites, the television, and NOAA radios. 
Regardless of the severity of the weather, the majority of participants carried out their 
severe weather plans and sheltered students immediately after a tornado warning was 
issued for their district. Non-weather factors influenced how they perceived the warning 
and how students were brought into shelter, but they did not affect their decision of 
whether or not to shelter; taking shelter was an automatic response after a warning was 
issued. These participants prefer more spatial information with clear indication of 
whether or not the stonn is likely to impact their district directly. Overall, participants 
found that extended tornado warning times would provide more time to go over plans 
and communicate with others, and recognized that this would require a modification of 
current warning plans and response. Several questioned whether a two-hour lead time 
would still bring the same sense of urgency as current warnings. This study shows that 
new meteorological advancements should respond to expressed needs of stakeholders. 
XI 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Introduction 
One reason natural disasters, such as tornadoes, are particularly damaging is 
because of the lack of collective partnerships and communication between stakeholders 
and the science community. Tornadoes are naturally occurring phenomena that humans 
cannot control. Meteorologists and weather forecasters can benefit from a better 
understanding of weather-societal interactions, so they can issue effective weather 
forecasts that the various publics find useful for severe weather decision making. Social 
science research on learning the various ways that weather sensitive decision makers 
use weather forecasts is underway, yet little progress has been made on weather-
sensitive decision making in institutions, and research related to societal impacts across 
the entire severe weather communication spectrum is needed. This study focuses on one 
component of the wide spectrum of weather information users: Kindergarden-1 ih 
grade public school district officials in the US. 
School decision makers are responsible for the safety of their students and staff. 
How do they use weather information when making important decisions during severe 
weather? Answering this question will provide useful information to forecasting 
software developers who need to effectively communicate what is known about tornado 
threats. Developing forecasting products without the interaction with the people who 
will use them is ineffective. My research is part of a new line of inquiry that starts with 
what people do with forecasts instead of what forecasts do to people. Only by paying 
attention to what information people seek and use can new improved tools truly be 
"improved" . 
This study consists of four related research questions: 
l . What is the K-12 public school official 's timeline of decision making and action 
implementation before, during, and after tornado warnings? 
2. What sources of weather information do key decision makers in K-12 public 
schools access and why? 
3. What are the non-weather factors that influence how decisions are made? 
4. What types of weather information might improve operations for K-12 public 
schools, and how might longer lead times change the decision making process? 
National Weather Service Warnings 
The National Weather Service (NWS) 1 is one of six federal agencies that make 
up the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Its mission is to 
provide "weather, hydrologic, and climate forecasts and warnings for the United States, 
its territories, adjacent waters and ocean areas, for the protection of life and property 
and the enhancement of the national economy" (NWS 2012). It is made up of numerous 
entities including the Storm Prediction Center, and local Weather Forecast Offices 
(WFOs) that provides taxpayer funded infom1ation and weather products to a variety of 
groups, including the public, companies, agencies, universities, cities, international 
partners, and many others. 
The NWS Storm Prediction Center (SPC) and the NWS Forecast Offices 
provide tornado infonnation via outlooks, watches, and warnings (Golden and Adams 
2000). The SPC notifies of potential tornado days at a regional scale several days in 
advance of severe convective weather. This severe weather info1mation is called an 
1 See Appendi x A for a fu ll li st of acronyms 
2 
outlook. Watches indicate that current conditions have the potential to form tornadoes , 
and are typically issued with four to six hours of lead time (Stumpf et al. 2008) . 
As of 20 I 2, NWS tornado warnings are issued by a "warning-on-detection" 
method. This means that a tornado/funnel cloud has either been seen by a spotter or 
indicated on radar (Stensrud et al. 2009). Before 2007, WFOs issued warnings by 
county. Since 2007, they have converted to issuing storm-based warnings, which are 
based off of the individual stonn instead of the county (Sutter and Erickson 2010). 
Using this method, approximately 70% less area and 600,000 fewer people are warned 
each year (U .S. Department of Commerce 2007; Waters 2004). This shift in policy was 
an example of the NWS transitioning to a new method of warning without taking into 
consideration the input of stakeholders. League et al. (2012) interviewed emergency 
managers in Oklahoma and Texas and found that although they had the capability to 
warn smaller areas using the storm based warning system, many did not. 
Warn-on-Forecast and Social Science Woven Into Meteorology 
This study is funded by the Warn-on-Forecast (WoF) project as part ofNOAA's 
National Severe Storms Laboratory (NSSL). WoF is developing a method of early 
tornado prediction with the mission of extending the tornado lead-time from minutes to 
potentially one to two hours by using convection-resolving, Doppler, and numerical 
models (Stensrud et al. 2009). NOAA anticipates that it will be operational by the year 
2020 (Stensrud et al. 2009). WoF will be a more dependable method of providing 
enhanced forecasts and predictions of severe weather to the general public, 
organizations, and stakeholders than the Warn-on-Detection model that is now being 
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used. WoF will look farther in advance by using numerical models to forecast future 
severe weather events, thus providing an extended warning lead time. 
My research is the social science component of WoF that brings stakeholder 
perspectives into the WoF process. The bulk of the WoF research centers on the 
development of the technology and software that will extend lead times primarily for 
tornadoes. My work is among the first effort to consider the social implications of 
longer lead-times. This research will highlight the importance of recognizing the full 
spectrum of warning time to include the outlook, watch, and warning time frames, 
beyond only the short NWS tornado warning lead time. 
This research study is one of several studies by Social Science Woven Into 
Meteorology (SSWIM) researchers in the National Weather Center in Norman, 
Oklahoma. SSWIM promotes collaborative research and partnerships between the 
social sciences and physical sciences of meteorology to enhance societal relevance of 
weather forecasts and highlight how stakeholders make weather-sensitive decisions. 
U.S. Schools 
On any weekday during the academic year, about 20-25% of the United States 
population is in a public school (Hull 2010). More specifically, as of 2007, there were 
over four million school staff members and nearly 50 million students enrolled in US 
public schools (Snyder et al. 2010). In ce1tain regions of the US, tornado vulnerability 
is a significant issue. Students represent a non-autonomous population who lack 
decision-making rights when it comes to their safety. Students rely on the expe1tise of 
their authority figures , who are usually teachers, principals, or other administrative 
staff, to make appropriate weather safety decisions for them. These people often have 
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no severe weather training. Additionally, most schools do not have formally designated 
emergency personnel. Because of the vulnerability of students, faculty , and staff in 
schools, the impacts of a tornado in a school setting can be deadly. 
Schools are only open a certain number of hours on weekdays, and are mostly 
closed during the summers, during breaks, and on particular holidays. According to the 
US Department of Education (2012), schools in the US average 180 days of instruction 
per year, at both the elementary and secondary levels . They vary in geographical and 
population size, demographics, and architectural layout. For this thesis, taking "shelter" 
includes a wide variety of places depending on the size and structure of each school. 
Each school has pre-designated "shelters" where students and staff go when tornado 
warnings are issued. These places are usually in classrooms, hallways, or the gym. No 
judgment is made as to how safe the "shelters" are. 
Summary of Thesis 
This thesis consists of eight chapters: the first chapter introduces the topic and 
research questions and provides some background ofNWS warnings, WoF, and 
SSWIM. The second chapter presents a literature review and description of several 
models and theories relevant to the results found in this study. The third chapter 
summarizes the study's methodology. The fom1h chapter is the results and discussion. 
This chapter relies heavily on story telling and quotes to reveal this group of 
stakeholders' perspectives using their own words. The fifth chapter provides 
conclusions. The sixth chapter gives a li st of potential future research that can build on 
the findings from this study. The final chapter provides a li st of recommendations to 
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Wof researchers emphasizing the need to work closely with stakeholders and to include 
their needs in the future development of severe weather warnings. 
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CHAPTER 3: LJTERA TURE REVIEW 
This chapter details four sets of literature relevant to hazards, behavior and 
response, and emergency management. lt pulls largely from geographers' natural 
hazards traditions. The sections included are: 1) warning systems model and weather 
warning partnership, 2) public response and behavior theories, 3) lead time, and 4) other 
research on how school administrators make weather sensitive decisions . 
Warning Systems Model and Weather Warning Partnership 
An effective tornado warning requires more than detection. Collaboration 
among several organizations is needed. Mileti et al. (1990) proposed an integrated 
warning system (IWS) for hazards, comprised of detection, management, and response 
subsystems. The detection subsystem is responsible for monitoring the environment, 
detecting the hazard, and linking the detection and management subsystems. The 
management subsystem acts as the liaison between the detection and response 
subsystems and is comprised largely of emergency managers who are given the roles of 
infonnation interpretation and public dissemination. The response subsystem consists of 
the ways that the publics and other weather-sensitive decision makers learn about, 
believe, personalize and take action in response to the hazard, including both individual 
interpretations of the information obtained and unofficial warnings sent among the 
public themselves (Mi leti et al. 1990). 
The weather warning partnership is an adaptation of the IWS model by Mileti et 
al. (1990), geared specifically towards severe weather warnings. Doswell et al. (l 998) 
and Golden and Adams (2000) discuss the concept of an integrated warning system that 
integrates warning detection and di ssemination among the NWS (detection subsystem), 
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news media and priva te sector meteorologists, emergency management officials and 
storm spotters (management subsystem), and the genera l public (response subsystem). 
This model, focused on severe weather, consists of fo recasting and detecting severe 
weather, disseminating vital infonnation, and understanding public response. An IWS 
stresses the concept that weather warnings are only effective when the entire system 
functions collectively, with each component putting in sufficient effort to prepare for a 
severe weather event before it happens, as well as communicating effectively during a 
weather warning (Doswell et al. 1998). 
Each component of the IWS has different responsibilities. The NWS is 
responsible for the initial forecasting of weather and the relay of this information to the 
other collaborators of the IWS (Doswell et al. 1988). Their mission is to protect life and 
property. The media, emergency managers, and private sector meteorologists are then 
responsible for providing the weather information to the various publics. The media, 
particularly the television, is the leading source of weather information (Hayden et al. 
2007). Additionally, local emergency managers are a vital source of weather 
information for stakeholders and the publics (Baumgart et al. 2008 ; League et al. 201 0; 
Dawson 1993). They are responsible for communicating warning infom1ation through 
an emergency alert system, activating sirens, if there a siren system exists, and advising 
schools and hospitals of appropriate actions to take (League et al. 2010). Emergency 
managers work closely with the NWS and rely heavily on the NWS infonnation . 
However, there are several concerns about this model. It assumes a one-size-fits-
all approach meaning that each component responds the same way for each severe 
weather event. This is not the case. For example, emergency managers often act 
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independently of the N WS. League et a l. (20 12) found that 36% of Oklahoma 
emergency managers and 39% of Texas emergency managers do not always warn the 
public when the NWS issues a tornado warning that includes some portion of their 
jurisdiction. Meanwhile, 79% of Oklahoma emergency managers and 60% of Texas 
emergency managers have or would warn the public about a tornado threat when the 
NWS has not yet issued a warning for their area of jurisdiction. Thus, the management 
subsystem does not always rely on the detection subsystem for information. 
Additionally, the warning process is not just a stimulus response since not 
everyone immediately takes action when the NWS issues a warning. Some people may 
choose not to take action at all. The public component of the warning systems model is 
far more complex than how it is portrayed by this model. The following sections will 
explore several theories and models that further describe the cognitive processes of 
hazard response. 
Public Response and Behavior Theories 
Public Response to Warnings Model 
Public awareness and response is a vital component of the IWS . Mileti and 
Sorenson developed a public response to warnings model that shows how people follow 
a similar process when confronted with a hazardous situation that lead to varying 
decisions made and actions taken. The first stage is "hearing the warning" (Mileti et al. 
1990). There is a growing number of social science research studies that consider public 
daily weather infonnation use. However the samples in these studies were small and 
therefore not necessarily generalizable (Lazo et al. 2009; HaITis Poll 2007 ; Bussum 
1999; Sink 1995 ; Saviers et a l. 1997 ; Krenz et al. 1993 ; and Legates et al. 1999). Thee 
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studies may be considered baseline studies for more comprehensive research effo rts. 
The remaining phases of public response are understanding, believing, personalizing, 
deciding and responding, and confirming the hazard (Mileti et al. 1990). Several factors 
influence how an individual proceeds through this decision process, including their risk 
perception and awareness of the hazard, their socioeconomic and education levels, and 
their cultural and environmental surroundings (Aguirre 2000). 
A significant criticism of Mileti and Sorenson 's model is that it depicts the flow 
of information uni-directionally, not allowing for the response subsystem, the public 
component of the IWS, to interact with or respond to the detection and management 
subsystems. In the Internet-connected universe the publics are no longer submissive. 
Rather, they actively seek information about the hazard, which the Mileti and Sorenson 
model fails to recognize (Rodriguez et al. 2007). Additionally, people often rely on 
unofficial information that they receive from environmental cues and non-weather 
sources and may not always rely on the NWS to obtain weather information. 
Meteorologists must understand how the general public uses weather 
infonnation during severe weather warnings to make decisions so they can provide the 
types of weather information and products that fit what people need. People do not 
respond to warnings in exactly the same way. Rather, individuals interpret the same 
information very differently, making it difficult for weather experts and emergency 
managers to gauge or predict public behaviors (Mileti et al. 1990; Sorenson 199 1). This 
model fail s to include how an individual makes protective action decisions, which 
might be not to take any action at all. 
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Protective Action Decision Model 
The Protective Action Decision Model (PADM) recognizes the shortcoming of 
the Mileti and Sorenson model (Lindell et al. 2004). This multi stage model assembles 
several key deci sion theories that depict how individuals respond to environmental cues 
and social messages, such as warnings. The PADM produces a behavioral response by 
incorporating eight questions that individuals are inclined to ask themselves during a 
warning (Table 1 ). It includes crucial pre-decisional processes such as the awareness 
and interpretation of environmental cues and social messages, as well as perceptions of 
threat and protective action (Lindell et al. 2004). Table 1 illustrates how the Mileti et al. 
(1990) public response to warnings model correlates with the P ADM. Mileti et al. ' s six 
different public responses to warnings are paired with the appropriate PADM activity. 
Stage 0 is an adaptation to depict how the hear and understand stages of the Mileti et al. 
model parallel the PADM's pre-decisional processes. The PADM model more 
realistically encapsulates actual human behavior by effectively incorporating societal 
and cultural influences, behavioral choice, and hazard response (Lindell et al. 2004). It 
highlights the protective action steps people take when confronted with a hazardous 
situation. 
11 
Table 1: PADM Warning Stages and Actions (Adapted from Lindell and Perry 
2004). The right column depicts the correlating public responses to warnings 
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The PADM model has recently been revised from its 2004 version (Lindell et al. 
2011 ). It has been changed to more explicitly identify the three central perceptions that 
lay the groundwork for making decisions and responding to short or long-term threats. 
They include threat perceptions, protective action perceptions, and stakeholder 
perceptions. 
UNlity Models and Bounded Rationality The01 y 
Behavioral decision-making theories describe how people choose to take 
protective actions. However, there is more to the process than simply the P ADM model 
and certain theories provide the framework under which protective action behaviors are 
carried out. Accord ing to Expected Uti li ty Theory, decision-makers as ess all possible 
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outcomes and choose what actions to take with the aim of maximizing their net benefits 
(Burton et al. 1993). This principle is entirely objective and appli es only to marginal 
situations, into which severe weather warnings do not fall (Kunreuther et al. 1978). 
Consequently, the Subjective Expected Utility Theory was developed that, although it 
still emphasizes maximizing net benefits, it also allows the deci sion-maker to 
subjectively choose the value of probable outcomes (Tobin et al. 1997). This theory 
provides a subjective platform upon which each individual can make decisions based on 
their own personal circumstances. 
The Subjective Expected Utility Theory, however, has its shortcomings. First, 
this theory assumes that the individual is provided with all the information on a 
particular hazard. Realistically, people are not always aware of all the associated risks. 
Second, this theory is rational only in static situations, and does not apply to extreme 
hazards, including tornado warnings (Slavic et al. 1974). Simon (1957) acknowledged 
these limitations and recognized that "the degree to which decision making is rational 
seems to be bounded by cognitive limitations" (Lindell and Perry 2004 33). This 
Bounded Rationality Theory explains how people make decisions when bounded by the 
law, societal norms, and cultural circumstances. Decision-makers bounded by factors 
such as these might act irrationally from an economic perspective, but feel as though 
their actions are most appropriate according to their personal boundaries and 
limitations. 
Cognitive and Conditional Factors 
Geographers Tobin and Montz ( 1997) provide another explanation for why 
certain people make what are perceived a irrational decisions. They categorize an 
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individual's response to hazards as being influenced by both cognitive and situational 
fac tors (Figure 1). Cognitive factors include personali ty characteristics and personal 
experience that alter an individual's perspective of nature and risk. Situationa l factors 
are more externally driven, such as age, gender, location, and income, which 
"complicate an individual 's range of choices" (Tobin and Montz 1997 135). An 
example is someone who stays in the San Francisco Bay area even though they are 
aware of the risk of a big earthquake occurring sometime in the future . To them, the 
benefits of the location outweigh the risk of the hazard, and the investments in their 
property and housing are so substantial that leaving seems impractical. 
Behavior and response are strongly influenced by the perception of the 
environment, or cognitive factors , as well as controlled by situational factors. Yet, this 
" interplay of environment and perception is constantly changing as more information is 
received and processed, further complicating .. . attempts to uncover decision-making 
processes." (Tobin and Montz 1997 141) Over the duration of severe weather watches 
and warnings, stakeholders, including school administrators and emergency managers, 
continuously change how they perceive an event as more information is received and 
processed. This process may even begin long before a watch is issued. Time is a 
determining factor in how the interplay of the environment and an individual's 
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Figure 1: Representation of the interplay between perception and response (from 
Tobin and Montz 1997). The bullets represent specific cognitive and situational 
factors that affect response. 
Situation Awareness 
Situation awareness can be defined as "the perception of elements in the 
environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, 
and the projection of their status in the near future" (Endsley 1995, pp. 36). This 
relatively new concept, coming from human factors research, became a focus of study 
beginning in the l 980's as Endsley noticed that decisions were becoming more 
multifaceted. He constructed a model that situates the three levels of situation 
awareness, which are perception of current situation, comprehension of current 
situation, and projection of future status, within the larger context of decision making 
(Figure 2). Situation awareness, along with other factors including the goals and 
expectations of the decision maker, experience, memory, and system design and 
capabilities, influence what decisions are made and actions implemented (Endsley 
1995). Individuals have varying levels of awareness of the situation in which they are 
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placed. These different perceptions of the space around them will influence how they 
respond to a situation. 
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Figure 2: Model of situation awareness in decision making (Endsley 1995). 
Lead Time 
Extending tornado warning lead time, or the time between the National Weather 
Services warning and the occurrence of a tornado, is a long-tenn goal of WoF (Stensrud 
et al. 2009). One purpose of my thesis is to communicate school administrators' 
thoughts and perceptions of an extended lead time to the new forecasting product 
developers and WoF scientists. The definition of lead time, for thi s thesis , goes beyond 
evaluating the effectiveness of longer lead times and pinpointing the ideal ational 
Weather Service tornado warning lead time. Lead time for stakeholders may include the 
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time far before a warning is issued. It prov ides time necessary to begin preparations and 
make decisions prior to the hazard . 
The majority of time and hazards research deems warnings as di stinct phases 
with a concrete start and fini sh time. Pinge l et al. (2005), Carsell et al. (2004), and 
Schumacher et al. (2010) consider lead time as being three di stinct phases: data 
collection and evaluation, notification and decision making, and action/mitigation time. 
Schumacher et al. (2010) modified Pingel et al. (2005) and Carse II et al. ' s (2004) 
models of lead time for floods by creating a similar version for tornadoes (Figure 3). 
This model demonstrates that the amount of time used to collect data and decide what 
actions to take determines what amount of time is remaining for actual action to take 
place. Neal in 1994 and 1997 theorized that the four phases of disaster (mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and recovery) are not separate and distinct categories, but rather 
overlapping phases that blend together through time. 
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Figure 3: Model of lead time for tornadoes (modified by Schumacher et al. (2010) 
from Pingel et al. (2005) and Carsell et al. (2004)). 
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A few studies show that having a longer lead-time in a National Weather 
Service warning may not be appreciated by the public. Hoekstra et al. 2011 found that 
the ideal tornado lead-time was 34 minutes for the National Weather Center visitors . 
Similarly, administrators of schools and nursing homes preferred tornado-warning lead-
times of no more than 30 minutes (Ewald et al. 2002). Few studies consider extended 
lead times, and the few that do consider it do not take into account the external 
implications that play a part in how longer warnings will impact society. This study will 
consider new understandings of the notion of lead-time. 
Other Research on how School Administrators Make Weather Sensitive Decisions 
School decision-makers are bounded by factors out of their control. During 
tornado warnings, schools within the NWS warned area have many possible actions to 
consider including, but not limited to, evacuating students or sheltering them in place. 
Schools receive information from the NWS and other sources and they disseminate that 
information to their populations and surrounding districts . Schools often receive calls 
from their local emergency managers when severe weather is expected (League et al. 
2010). The emergency managers provide information to initiate school emergency 
plans. Plans include closing the school, evacuating students, or transporting students to 
predetern1ined shelters. Is this the only source schools use? How are schools bounded 
by cognitive and situational limitations? What infornrntion do school officials want? 
There are only a limited number of studies evaluating the decision-making 
processes and information use within a school setting. Most studies focus on winter 
weather, earthquakes, or other technological and human-induced disasters. These 
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studies focus more on school closures and delays rather than on the decision making 
process of deciding whether or not to shelter students in place in a tornado situation. 
The WxEM group in North Carolina is working with NWS Office of Science 
and Technology to develop and evaluate technologies with the goal of improving the 
weather decision support to emergency managers during events such as hurricanes, 
tornadoes, blizzards, and floods. Their major questions include the following: 
What are the critical decisions being made and by whom? 
What knowledge does the decision maker need? 
Where does this knowledge come from? and 
What influences the confidence of the decision maker? 
This group recently completed another study that focused on the inclement 
weather decision process for schools in North Carolina during winter weather. The 
methodology for their 2010-011 research, involved three rounds of interviews with 
multiple participants from nine counties in central and western North Carolina and a 
statewide web based survey (Montz et al. 2012). 
The results of their study included the following 8 findings: 
l) Transportation directors were most likely to gather the weather infonnation 
and communicate it to others, though these employees often struggled to find 
and understand the weather infonnation. 
2) The main weather sources used by the school decision makers were the 
television and their local NWS , with whom many conmmnicated. 
3) Decision makers contacted their school staffs long before the event (up to 
days) , preparing them of the potential impacts. 
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4) There were differences according to schoo l size, with smaller schools more 
likely to use more than six sources of weather information, more likely to pass 
information on, less likely to contact their NWS, and less likely to use media to 
pass information on. 
5) There are complex interactions between weather information and decision 
making, especially that location, resource availability, and experience all have a 
direct affect on what decisions are made. 
6) Decision makers made a series of decisions based on 2-way communication 
with other staff and gathered many different types of information from multiple 
sources, using their own understanding of the forecast to make conclusions 
about road conditions. 
7) School decision makers stated the need for an animated onset map to get a 
better idea of what time the storm is expected to approach their location, as well 
as a simplified area forecast with clear infmmation. 
8) The authors stressed that "one size does not fit all", and every decision maker, 
many of whom are not weather savvy, will react differently according to their 
own interpretations of the data (Montz et al. 2012). 
Call and Coleman (2012, forthcoming) researched the factors that go into 
deciding whether or not to close schools for inclement weather, and how this decision 
process varies geographically. Their study questions centered on how school 
administrators obtain and interpret weather data, how non-meteorological criteria 
influence the closing/delaying decision, and what weather conditions result in the most 
school closures and delays. They found that the decis ion making process was similar 
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regard I es of the type of weather event and geographic location. Directors of 
transportation were fo und to play an integral part of the decis ion making process, 
becoming weather knowl edgeable from experience not training. Non-weather factors 
contributed minimall y to closing decisions since the directors of transportation used 
student and staff safety as their leading rationale for closing. Although his study focused 
on winter weather and closures, the authors believe these results can be applied to other 
weather events in other geographic areas (Call and Coleman 2012, forthcoming). 
A study conducted by Kano and Bourque (2008) aimed to assess what 
distinguishes schools that are better prepared for emergencies and disasters from 
schools that are less prepared. By surveying 157 schools in California between 2005 
and 2006, the authors pinpointed several correlates of emergency preparedness. They 
found that having funds directed to preparedness activities, as well as a faculty member 
who is specifically designated to handle preparedness responsibilities led to greater 
overall preparedness. The authors were surprised to find that size, distance from urban 
centers, available resources, and prior experience was not correlated with preparedness 
level. Although their study focused primarily on earthquakes, technological hazards , 
and human-induced hazards, it highlights several significant points regarding 
emergency preparedness that may be applicable to severe weather hazards as well 
(Kano and Bourque 2008). 
A study conducted by Burling and Hyle (1997) took a systematic approach and 
sampled the district plans of 36 school districts across the nation. They found that larger 
schools were found to have less detailed di saster plans, while smaller more rural schools 
had more detailed plans. Also, di stri cts in areas with more w1predictable hazards such 
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as earthquakes, were fo und to have more deta iled plans than those in areas where 
hazards are more predictable (e.g. hurricanes) . Along with sampling di stri ct plans, the 
authors also interviewed several di stri ct administrators to pinpoint any relationship 
between past experi ences and changes in school policies. They found that some 
administrators readily integrated their experiences into their lessons while others did not 
change their policies at all (Burling and Hyle 1997). 
A multidisciplinary study that looked at schools along with other local decision 
making organizations during an unusual tornado occurrence on May 22, 2008 
highlighted the importance of societal factors in decision-maker perceptions and 
behavior (Schumacher et al. 2010) . This was the first study that applied Mileti and 
Sorenson's public response model to decision-maker behavior, instead of solely to the 
public. The authors conducted interviews with local decision-makers, concluding that 
decision makers interpreted warnings differently. Also, having previous knowledge 
with severe weather influenced how they perceived the warning. Their study also called 
attention to the many complexities that exist in the severe weather communication 
process, emphasizing that lead-time is only one factor in the warning communication 
process and future research needs to consider more than just lead-time influences 
(Schumacher et al. 2010). 
As forecasts and technologies continue to improve, the warning paradigm will 
shift to longer lead-times (Stensrud et al. 2009). Before thi s transition occurs, it is vita l 
to understand current warning response to improve the effecti veness of fu ture systems. 
Researching school administra tors' decisions, one subset of the warning c01mn unication 
spectrum, and their response to NWS tornado warnings, is a step toward gathering this 
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information. Although researching schools and weather warnings cannot answer all the 
questions pertaining to weather-sensitive dec ision-making, it can bring forecaster 
attention to one subset of stakeholder perspectives. Research calls for a more thorough 
consideration of contextual factors that influence decision-making in school districts . 
Human decisions and behavior are based on weather conditions, forecasts, and many 
other factors . My study focuses on the effects of some of the external forces that may 
influence decision behavior within school settings as well as provide preliminary 
thoughts on extended tornado warning lead times from this stakeholder perspective. 
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CHAPTER4:METHODOLOGY 
My study consists of six in-depth case studies of US public school districts that 
were placed under at least one National Weather Service tornado warning during the 
spring 201 I severe stonn season. 
Sampling Methodology 
The most essential source I used is the Iowa Environmental Mesonet (IEM), 
which collects and stores environmental data from a variety of networks, and includes 
daily summary images of stonn-based warnings and archived NWS watches and 
warnings. The archived text information provided by the IEM allowed me to create a 
database with the date, the issuance and expiration times of the warning, and the NWS 
forecasting office location that issued the warning(s). The IEM also provides storm 
reports that featured a list of damages, injuries, and fatalities and radar images. It also 
provided a history of the warning including the duration and change of time/location, 
intensity of the storm, and recommended precautionary actions the particular warning or 
warnmgs. 
The severe weather home page on the IEM website 
(http: //mesonet.agron.iastate.edu/current/severe.phtml) provides daily summary images 
of storm based warnings. Using this tool, I selected the date and sorted by weather 
forecasting office to receive a summary of all NWS storm based warnings issued on the 
day of choosing (including severe thunderstorm and tornado warnings). 1 made note of 
all the forecasting offices that issued warnings for that day. I then used the archived 
warning data (http://mesonet.agron.iastate.edu/request/gis/watchwam.phtml) to examine 
tbe NWS warnings for a time period of my choosing. 
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Once I had all of the warning polygons, I was able to pinpoint which school 
di stri cts were under each warning by overl aying the archi ved warning polygons from 
the IEM with Google Eaiih Place data (public school di stri cts) (Figure 4 and Figure 5). 
This overlay technique provides spatial verifi cation that a school d istrict is located 
within a tornado-warning polygon. Additional information from the affected school 
di strict was obtained in order to ensure that the placement of the di strict was accurate; 
cross-referencing is necessary since it is not uncommon for the warning data to be 
displayed in a different datum (or reference point) than the school district data layer. 
The warning polygons used were storm-based warning polygons. 
Figure 4: An overlay of NWS warning polygons with school data from Google 




Figure 5: A zoomed-in view of a warning polygon encompassing a school district in 
Arkansas on April 24, 2011. Zooming in allows for the school district icons to 
appear. 
Data Collection 
My samples were chosen from the warning data for April and May 2011. I 
compiled a database of schools under warning(s) starting on the 25th of April. Because 
almost all warning polygons encompassed at least one school, I needed to find a way to 
limit which schools I included in my database to create a reasonable sample. I narrowed 
my case study selection to districts where the superintendent's contact information was 
conveniently located via their district website. I contacted the superintendent from that 
district within a week after the event. In total, I contacted 80 administrators and 
interviewed 11. The case studies were districts under NWS warning(s) on either April 
28th or May 2511\ 2011 ( see Figures 6 and 7 for a zoomed out view of all tornado 
warnings issued on those days). The duration of these warnings were from 15 to 50 
minutes. These sample days were soon after the large tornado outbreak in the southeast 
on April 27th and the Joplin tornado on May 22nd . 
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Figure 6: Tornado warnings issued by the NWS on April 28t\ 2011. 
Figure 7: Tornado warnings issued by the NWS on May 25th , 2011. 
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J set up interview times with the superin tendents who responded and were 
willing to participate. A few of the superin tendents referred me to someone else in the 
di strict to interview. Those people are included in the total number of those l contacted . 
Interviewing post-event allowed me to gain insight as to the actual behavior of the 
decision makers rather than their idealized behavior (Hammer et a l. 2002). 1 interviewed 
between one and three people with varying positions from six school di stri cts, with a 
total of 11 participants (Table 2). 
Table 2: Participant positions from each school district. 




Director of Safety and Security 
C Superintendent 
Director of Transportation Services 
D Communications and Public Relations Officer 
Principal 
E Assistant Superintendent 
Superintendent 
F Technology Director 
Principal 
Social Science Methodologies 
I used snowball sampling to gather more data from a wider spectrum of people 
involved in the process. I asked my initial participants to refer me to anyone they 
considered to be vital decision-makers during the warning event. Snowball sampling is 
a preferred method for exploratory and qualitative studies aimed at obtaining 
information on sensitive topics from diffi cult to reach parti cipants. 
I used semi-structured interviews. This technique is especially usefu l when 
interv iewing severa l peop le who have different job titles, such a in a school etting 
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(Longhurst 2010) . Semi-structured interviews initiate co llaboration between the 
researcher and the parti cipant, allowing the participant to guide the in terview and feel 
free to express their own views and perspectives. Semi-structured interviews are a 
reliable data collection method, allowing for compari sons between participants 
(Longhurst 2010). The semi-structured interview in thi s study included questi ons on 
demographic information, sources of weather information, warning response and 
decision-making, and weather product preferences. I conducted only phone interviews. 
The interviews lasted on average of just under one hour. Appendix B provides the 
interview script. 
Sampling Criteria and Limitations 
The schools selected to take part in this study were public schools in the central 
and eastern regions of the US. I preferred interviewing more than one person from each 
district to better understand the decisions made within the district. However, for three of 
the six districts included in my study, I interviewed only the superintendent because 
he/she said reported that he/she is the sole decision makers during the particular 
warning period. I only sampled districts that were under NWS warnings since that is the 
archived data source that I acquired. 
An additional selection parameter is that the schools being researched must have 
been under a tornado warning, but not physically impacted by a tornado. Lastly, and 
arguably the most important selection parameter, warnings had to occur during school 
hours, which I considered as 11 30 through 2000 UTC time Monday tlu·ough Friday. 
Thi s is equiva lent to approximately 7:30 am through 4:00 pm, in the Eastern Time zone. 
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Adjustments to thi time range were made according to the time zone in which the 
warning was issued. 
Data Analysis 
1 used qualitative method techniques to analyze the interview responses. I first 
uploaded the sound files into a computer program called TAMS analyzer, which 
facilitated the transcribing process. Each transcription took between four and five hours. 
The TAMS program, which stands for Text Analysis Markup System, is an open source 
Macintosh qualitative research tool that was designed for use in ethnographic research. I 
explored the data for common themes and patterns. I came up with an initial set of 
codes and then added and removed codes as I saw fit as I coded each interview 




CHAPTER 5: RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
This chapter reports on the results of the interviews. It is divided into fi ve parts: 
1) the timeline of decisions made and actions taken, 2) sources used, 3) non-weather 
factor influences on decision making, 4) weather information preferences, and 5) 
thoughts on current and extended lead times. The first section on the timeline conveys 
the participants' stories as separate cases, to provide an understanding of the 
individualistic nature of each situation and a context for why particular decisions were 
made. This section ends with a cumulative assessment of all the participants' decisions 
and actions. The remaining sections will be described aggregately, as many of the cases 
used sources for similar reasons, were influenced by related non-weather factors , and 
shared similar weather information preferences. These sections, in aggregate form, 
more clearly and strongly illustrate the complexities school district decision makers are 
faced with during tornado warnings. 
Timeline of Decisions and Actions 
The decisions made and actions taken are unique to the individual. The 
following are brief descriptions of what each participant did before, during, and after 
the waming(s). Descriptions of each warning and district will be kept to a minimum. I 
will provide approximate student populations and only vaguely discuss their location to 
ensure the confidentiality of my paiiicipants. 
School District A 
This school district encompasses nearly I 00 square miles in Mi ssouri and has a 
student population of approximately 3,500 students. Thi s di strict was under NWS 
warning polygons four times over about a two-hour period around lunchtime, and each 
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school in thi s di stri ct was under more than one tornado warning during thi time. I 
interviewed the superintendent. 
Su erintendent 
He had been the superintendent of school Di strict A for three years. He, along 
with colleagues, was monitoring the weather south of the district prior to the warning 
issuance. He emailed bis staff two or three times several hours before the warning was 
issued to alert them of potential hazardous weather and suggest beginning to take 
preparatory actions. The NOAA Weather Radio in his office alerted him of the warning. 
He then sent a text message to the building administrators notifying them of the 
warning. He asked the building administrators to reply back to him with an "all clear" 
once the warnings expired. He mentioned that the local sirens went off shortly after the 
NOAA weather began relaying the weather information. Students began taking shelter. 
During the warning, he was in communication with designated faculty, including 
weather spotters and the chief of fire and rescue for the county, who were monitoring 
the weather. After the severe weather day, he and his staff discussed what went well and 
what procedures need improvement. 
School District B 
This school district encompasses approximately 85 square miles in Missouri and 
has a student population of approximately 11 ,000 students. This district experienced 
five warnings spanning about two hours around lunchtime, and each school in this 
district was under at least one tornado warning, with the majority experiencing more 
than two warnings during thi s time. I interviewed the superintendent and director of 





He had been the superintendent of school Di strict B for three years . He 
mentioned that the director of safety and security and law enforcement officers 
monitored the weather days ahead of expected severe weather. He received an email 
from the director of safety and security that is also sent out to other directors and 
principals, infonning him that severe weather was possible mid-morning. Students in 
outdoor classrooms were brought inside. He, along with the directors and principals, 
received an email from the director of safety and security that a warning has been issued 
just before lunch. The sirens then went off. He was out of his office visiting schools 
when he received the email and his secretary's phone call. He decided to go to the 
largest elementary school to observe procedures. At the elementary school, he did not 
take the lead. He stood back and watched the proceedings take place because he felt his 
role was too "erratic." 
"I never want to put myself in a position where I'm absolutely needed or critical 
to a process because I'm unpredictable as far as my presence, so I just mostly 
stood by and observed. And that's mainly what I did ... a system needs to run 
without a superintendents' interaction ... because they will be in and out and 
unavailable, and so things need to happen whether or not I'm there." 
- Superintendent from District B 
He completely "let [the Director of Safety and Security] run the show when it's severe 
weather," and was more interested in observing proceedings at their largest elementary 
school to see how fast the students can be sheltered. 
He said that the principals at each school announced over the intercom that 
everyone needed to follow severe weather procedures and begin to take shelter. 
Students and faculty took shelter, and remained in predetermined sheltered areas for the 
33 
) 
duration of all the warnings. The secretary was in the basemen t monitoring the weather 
on her computer, via NOAA websites. The superintendent and hi s secretary received ten 
emails during the first warning from the director of safety and securi ty. He mentioned 
that parents were calling while everyone was in shelter. Post-warning, be debriefed with 
faculty and discussed the possibility of having an automated message to send out to 
parents to update them on the situation. 
Director of Safety and Security 
He was been the director of safety and security in District B for seven years. 
Earlier in the year, he recommended that the district put a computer in the basement of 
the central office so weather monitoring could continue while being in a sheltered area. 
He is responsible for monitoring the weather, and thus knew days ahead of time that 
severe weather was approaching. That morning, he was the official at a motor vehicle 
accident on the highway. When the watch was issued, he called and emailed the 
superintendent's office immediately. He suggested that the superintendent send out 
emails to everyone that severe weather is coming and to prepare to take action. The 
police dispatcher received the warning from the NWS through a Teletype; this 
information was forwarded to him via email on his phone. He then emailed the 
superintendent about the first tornado warning. This action led to people in the schools 
taking shelter in their pre-designated tornado shelters. He then sent out another message 
advising students and staff to stay in their safe places for the duration of all the 
warnings, which totaled more than one hour. When all the NWS warnings expired for 










he plans to have a post warning debriefing with faculty to talk about some 
communication issues they had with phones. 
School District C 
This school district is in a rural county in Virginia encompassing approximately 
290 square miles and has a population of approximately 2500 students. This district 
experienced one NWS warning mid-morning, that affected some, but not all, of the 
schools in the district. I interviewed the superintendent. 
Superintendent 
She had been the superintendent of District C for four years. She, along with her 
staff of the principals and secretaries, paid attention to severe weather starting several 
hours before the issuance of the warning. That morning, she was visiting the main high 
school to listen to student presentations. Using her smart phone, she sent out an email to 
staff to begin preparations and to ensure that NOAA radios were working properly. She 
heard the principal of the high school that she was visiting brief students on the severe 
weather plan in case a warning was issued. She then went to the office of this high 
school to ensure that the secretary and assistant principals were monitoring the weather. 
She was alerted of the warning via phone and email from the director of secondary 
education. The warning was then am1ounced over the intercom at individual schools as 
well as via outdoor bells . As students were moving to shelters, she was on the phone 
with the other schools ensuring that they were also going to pre-determined shelters. 
When the warning expired, students were brought back to their classrooms. She 
mentioned a desire to have a post-warning debriefing to discuss what went well and 





district's small s ize, thi s superintendent mentioned that she is the only person 
responsible during these situations and that "things like this are just kind of all vested in 
me." She considered herself the school district's emergency manager since they lack the 
funds to employee others with this role. 
School District D 
This district is in a rural area of Maryland encompassing approximately 45 
square miles and has a population of slightly less than 30,000 students. This district 
experienced five warnings spanning nearly two hours in the morning. Some schools in 
this district were under no warnings, while others experienced all five warnings during 
this time. I interviewed the transportation services department director, the 
communication and public relations officer, and a principal. 
Director of Transportation Services 
He had been the director of transportation services of school District D for one 
year. He monitored the weather 24 hours beforehand. He was at home when he was 
alerted of the first warning in the early morning via the television. He immediately 
contacted staff in the central office by phone. He then began notifying bus contractors 
by phone since the first warning was issued when busses were still on the road picking 
up and dropping off students at schools. He said that it was impossible to contact 
individual busses and so he made the decision to keep the busses on the roads picking 
up students as planned. He then drove to school and monitored Doppler radar and NWS 
websites with the staff. Individual schools were notified of the warning via the 
AlertNow system from the central office and were told to follow severe weather 
procedures. Students and staff then began taking shelter. He mentioned a desire to have 
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a post-warning debriefing to di scuss necessary changes to procedures and to resolve any 
communication issues. This participant, whose role and responsibiliti es include 
monitoring the weather, utilized more complex weather sources to gather information, 
such as Doppler radar than other participants. 
Communication and Public Relations Officer 
She has held this role for 25 years . She met with other staff in the beginning of 
the year to plan and assign responsibilities for severe weather events. She stressed that 
she works on the communication side and plays only a small part in interpreting the 
weather information. She relies on the transportation department and law enforcement 
for that. On this day, however, she did feel the need to monitor the weather since it was 
all over the news. She mainly watched the television and looked at NOAA websites for 
weather inforn1ation. She was in constant communication with the transportation 
department director, who called her to inform her that a warning was issued early that 
morning. She verified the warning with the superintendent. She then briefed her 
assistant, who went on to speak with the district's website designer and local television 
station to put announcements out to infom1 parents of the situation. They also used the 
AlertNow phone system to notify all principals and parents . 
The warning information was relayed to students and teachers via the intercom 
or phone system depending on the school. Students and staff then took shelter and 
stayed in shelter for the entirety of all the warnings. She mentioned wanting to have a 
post-warning debriefing to discuss what worked and what needs improvement. In 










" We ' re going to meet as a group and see what we could've done better. There 
were some principals that we called on the ce ll phone that said that they didn 't 
get the message, so we're looking at why they didn ' t get the message, we're 
looking at okay let 's suppose the principal doesn ' t answer the phone, we need to 
have something in place to get the message to someone else in this school as 
well. So we're looking at our communication procedures to see how we can 
tighten them up and make them more effective." 
- Communications and Public Relations Officer in District D 
She was in communication throughout the entirety of the warnings with 
numerous staff, including the superintendent, assistant superintendent, the 
transportation director, and the directors of the elementary, middle, and high schools. 
Because of its larger size, this district employs more staff with designated emergency 
roles. 
Principal 
He had been the principal of one of the schools in District D for about five 
years. He mentioned that he did not hear anything about approaching bad weather on 
the news, and thus he was not monitoring it that morning. On his drive to work, he 
heard on the radio that they were under a watch. He was in his office for about 20 
minutes before he got a phone call from his director in the central office that a warning 
was issued. His secretary then ran into his office and told him they were under a 
warning. He emailed the secretaries and teachers telling them of the warning and used 
the PA system to announce the warning to the school. Staff received emai Is on their 
phones. Because it was so early, staff was still walking into the buildings. AtTiving 
teachers were notified of the warning via a few secretaries who stood at the entrances. 
With the help of other staff, he retrieved all students from the busses and moved 
them into the gym. Several teachers stayed in the lobby outside of the gym to facilitate 
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the process . Once the first warning was lifted, students were brought back into their 
classrooms from their sheltered areas. Once the second warning was issued, he, along 
with the recommendations from the director and the director 's secretary, decided to 
keep students in their first class period for the duration of the remaining warnings. Post-
warning, he debriefed with the teachers and staff to consider changing the severe 
weather drill to a "hurricane/tornado drill" that is to be held at least once a year. 
School District E 
This district is located in a rural/suburban country in Pennsylvania, and has a 
population of over 3,000 students. This district experienced three warnings spanning 
more than an hour mid morning. Each school in the district was under at least one 
warning during this time. I interviewed the assistant superintendent. 
Assistant Superintendent 
He had been the assistant superintendent of District E for about five years. His 
district conducts severe weather exercises every spring. He was monitoring the weather 
hours earlier. He follows the NIMS protocol and several of his administrators are NIMS 
certified. When the warning was issued, he told his secretary to begin calling individual 
schools. The secretary called three schools while he called the remaining two, to split 
the load and increase efficiency. People in schools with access to the Internet were 
monitoring the weather at their individual schools. His district posted their procedures 
on their school website to let parents know what they were doing in real time. 
Throughout the event, he listened frequently to one of the local television 
broadcasters who was the husband of one of the teachers at his district. He said, 




of the head meteorologists and the local news station . So it' s kind of an inside track so 
to speak." He trusts this relationship and thus, when thi s meteoro logist spec ifica ll y 
called out their district on television as being in the path of the storm, which spurred 
many phone calls from concerned parents, he decided to take hi s advice and keep 
students in shelter for the duration of all the warnings. 
"that particular day was interesting because one of the alerts that they called 
off ... the local meteorologist said ... while the warnings are off I have concern ... 
So rather than moving kids back in and out of the hallways we elected just to 
stay in that situation and sure enough, within a matter of minutes, the next 
warning was issued ... if we just went with what the weather radio was saying 
we would have made an additional move in and out of classrooms in a matter of 
5 minutes ... " 
- Assistant Superintendent in District E 
He advised the students and faculty in each school to remain in a shelter until they got a 
call from the central office with updated information, and to expect the process to be 
long. Teachers and principals reported that staying in shelter for the duration of all the 
warnings instead of going back and forth between shelters and classrooms was helpful. 
Post-warning, he mentioned a desire to debrief mainly on communication issues that 
arose during procedures. 
School District F 
This district is located in a rural area in Pennsylvania encompassing 
approximately 110 square miles and has a large population of over 40,000 students. 
This district experienced three warnings spanning more than an hour in mid morning. 
Some schools in this district were under no warnings, while others experienced all three 
warnings during this time. I interviewed the superintendent, the technology director, 





He had been the superintendent of District F for about two years. His di strict 
reviews the severe weather procedures in the begi nning of the year in each building. 
Every March, they conduct severe weather drill s in co llaboration with the county. At 
the time the first warning was issued, he was in a meeting with all staff and 
administrators of the district. Several of the attendees began getting text messages and 
alerts on their phones that a warning had been issued. He verified the warning via 
NOAA websites . He told the principals of the schools that were most likely to be 
impacted to activate their severe weather plan and call their secretaries. He was aware 
of the most impacted areas because he was looking at the warning polygons. He told 
everyone else to call their secretaries and activate their emergency weather procedures, 
but not to take shelter yet. The secretaries of each school contacted the teachers via 
intercoms. He sent each of the principals to their respective schools, which, in 
hindsight, he chuckled about since it required driving during a tornado warning. 
Secretaries stood at the doors of schools directing students and parents inside. 
The students in schools under the warning, and near warned areas, took shelter. He 
understood that shelters with fewer windows are ideal. However, due to the pressures 
of building "green," he had recently added more windows to increase natural light. 
Additionally, he was uncertain as to where his teachers should shelter students as the 
warning unfolded. 
"We initially brought them in the gym and then we realized, well the gym is two 
stories and at the top there are windows that circle the area , that ' s not a good 
thing, so we moved them back into the buildings. But all of our buildings ha e 
windows at the end of the hallways, we have a t:\vo-story lobby with glass from 











result of a little more lead time, to say okay where do we want to house 
students? ... " 
- Superintendent in Di strict F 
After the warning expired, students were brought back into their classrooms. 
This process repeated for the second warning. For the third warning, fewer schools took 
shelter since this warning only affected a small number of schools in the county. He 
still called all the schools alerting them of the warning. He mentioned that the local 
broadcast meteorologist singled out his district in his broadcast. He made the decision to 
keep AM kindergarteners at the school but he cancelled the PM kindergarten session. 
Throughout the warnings, he was sending out AlertNow messages to infonn parents of 
the situation. After the warnings expired, he expressed a desire to create more specific 
instructions of what actions to take in future situations. 
Technology Director 
He had been the technology director of District F for approximately 13 years. He 
mentioned that this district conducts severe weather drills and reviews the severe 
weather plan before storm season each year. He was attending the staff meeting with the 
superintendent when the warning was issued. Once people began getting texts and 
alerts, he pulled up the NOAA website, saw that his county was under a warning, and 
relayed this information to the superintendent, who then made the decision to begin 
activating the severe weather plans. For the second warning, the superintendent and 
assistant superintendent called principals alerting them of continued severe weather. For 
the third warning, operations shifted. The superintendent was no longer available and so 







buildings that they thought were potenti ally in the path of the storm himself. In this 
di stri ct, the students went in and out of sheltered areas as the warnings came and went. 
He is currently working with staff to fi gure out why some of the NOAA radios were not 
functioning properly. He mentioned that the superintendent is now working with the 
leadership team to better di sperse responsibilities among the di stri ct and clarify the 
chain of command. 
Principal 
He had been the principal of one of the schools in District F for about two years. 
The superintendent monitored the weather beforehand via NOAA websites. He was also 
in the administrative meeting along with the previous two participants from this distri ct 
when the warning was issued. The superintendent told him to report back to his school 
and follow the severe weather plan. On his way back to his building, he contacted the 
school resource officer and told him to begin moving students to sheltered areas. When 
he arrived at his school, he made an announcement over the intercom and emailed 
teachers to alert them of the situation. He then sent out an automated call to parents to 
let them know that afternoon kindergarten was cancelled for that day. Elementary 
students rushed off of busses to sheltered areas. He went to one part of the school while 
his assistant principals covered the remaining areas to ensure that procedures were 
going smoothly. When the first warning expired, he sent his students back to their 
classrooms. He was notified of the second warning via the NOAA radio and websites , 
and sent students back to the sheltered areas. Thi s is similar to what occmTed dw-ing the 
third warning. Post- warning, he was considering di scussing alternative shelter areas 






General Timefine of Participant Action and Sources Used 
These brief descriptions provide the indi vidual stories of the interview 
participants. Each case is unique as each decision maker made different decisions, yet 
there are similarities. A timeline representing the general behavior of the participants 
along with the weather sources used is found in Figure 8. Not all decision makers 
followed this timeline. The timeline represents a generalization of what was mentioned 
by my participants. This illustration offers a reference that concisely and collectively 
connects the time line of decisions made by the participants. 
Weather Information Used 
Local TV stations 
OAA websites 
NOAA Weather radios 
Local universities/meteorologists 
Transportation/Safety Director 
Severe Weather Status at School Districts 






The left s ide of the timeline shows the behavior of the official when there wa 
no severe weather. All of my participants mentioned that they perfom1 evere weather 
drills at least once a year, with the majority performing drill s more than once a year. 
Participants referred to them by a variety of names including, 'tornado drill s,"" e ere 
weather drills ," and "tornado/hun-icane drills. " Also during the majority of the year 
when there is no severe weather, school district officials held administrative meeting to 
discuss and edit existing severe weather plans. The superintendent normally led these 
meetings. Staff took advantage of this planning time to build relationships with their 
local police departments, neighboring districts, and district staff, especially with the 
transportation and safety directors. Like emergency managers, school district officials 
build relationships when weather is benign, so they can rely on those sources when 
faced with severe weather. This timeline shows that officials prepare in many steps 
during the majority of the year before the onset of any severe weather. 
When severe weather was approaching, officials began much of the 
communication with administration, staff, parents, students, and transp01iation di.rector 
that continued throughout the entirety of the event. Cell phones, land lines , text 
messaging, intercoms (PA system), emails (both to computers and cell phones) , and 
two-way radios were the sources most often mentioned for communication. Participant 
also mentioned that at least one staff member was monitoring the weather from a few 
days before the warning was issued until after it had expired . Typically, those 
employees with designated emergency preparedness roles , uch as technology and 
safety director , took on the respon ibility of weather monitoring. 
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Several hours before the arr iva l of a evere weather y tern , de ignated taff 
brought in students and faculty who were out ide via outdoor irens , cell phone , or 
word of mouth , and were in constant communication with those on fie ld trips ia cell 
phones and text messaging. Parents were often notified via school di strict website 
updates, or from alerts sent to them through services such as AlertNow. Several 
participants mentioned that they communicated with each school to ensure that their 
weather radios were functioning properly. Weather information sources when severe 
weather was approaching consisted mainly of local TV stations, NOAA websites , 
NOAA weather radios, and transportation and safety directors. 
Participants learned that a warning was issued from a variety of sources, many 
of which are the same that they used to monitor the approaching weather. The most 
prominent sources include hearing their local broadcast meteorologist say it on 
television, hearing it from their NOAA weather radio, seeing the warning online on a 
NOAA website, or getting a call from technology/safety directors or local 
meteorologists. Further specifics and discussion on the sources used will be included in 
the next section. Once they became aware that a warning was in place, different people 
took a variety of actions. Several participants verified that there actually was a ational 
Weather Service warning in place by accessing more than one source. Once he/she wa 
certain that the district was inside a warning polygon, he/she began communicating thi 
information to the individual schools in their district. Typically the superi ntendent and 
their secretaries took on thi s role. They advised the building director and/or principal 
of each building to activate their severe weather plan, which consisted primaril of 




structure serves as a safe shelter. They recognized that large room with windows are 
not very safe. However, some participants were still not sure where to helter students at 
the time of the warni ng even though predetermined shelters were dec ided upon as part 
of their severe weather plans. 
Within each di strict, there is a chain of responsibility among administrators and 
staff that dictates who makes the important decisions during the warning. Thi s specific 
topic was only explicitly addressed in five of the 11 interviews, though similar 
observations are implied in the remaining interviews. Figure 9 illustrates the chain of 
responsibility that was generally found in the sample districts. All the possible contacts 
that were mentioned by the participants are included; each district thus does not have all 
of the reported personnel in the figure . Generally, the superintendent has the highest 
status, unless he/she is out of the office. In that case, the assistant superintendent takes 
over as lead decision maker. From there, depending on the district, 
communication/transportation/safety directors, directors of elementary, middle, and 
high schools, leadership/crisis teams/human resources, and principals are the second in 





























The majority of district superintendents worked with at least one other person , 
whether that was a transportation director, secondary education directors, or leadership 
team members, when making these severe weather decisions. ln a few cases, omeone 
other than the superintendent, such as the transportation director, made the vital 
decision of whether or not and when to she lter students in place. Thus, the cha in of 
responsibility varies widely among districts , and ,,veather tool developers need to take 
these significant differences into consideration when des igning new weather product a 
every user has varying needs and responsibilities. 
Five out of the six di stricts were under more than one warnin° during hour of 
operation. These di stri cts faced between three and ftve warnings . Of the ft , e di . trict. 




for the entirety of all the warnings, District F had their students go back and forth 
between shelters and classrooms, and the data was not co llected for the remaining 
district, District A. 
After the warning(s) expired, damage assessments were perfonned and staff and 
administrators debriefed to evaluate what went well and wrong during the proceedings. 
A few participants mentioned that the communication aspect needed to be reevaluated 
post warning. After discussing the event, participants mentioned that any necessary 
changes to their plans and procedures would be made. 
Relation to Other Research 
There are two main take home points from this timeline. First, as seen in Figure 
8, communication with staff, faculty, administrators, and parents spanned several severe 
weather states, and played a vital component in the entire severe weather process. This 
observation is similar to what Neal (1997) observed: the different phases of lead time 
and warning response are more intertwined than distinct. This contrasts with work by 
Schumacher (2010) on tornadoes and Pingel et al. (2005) and Carsell et al. (2004) on 
floods , who found that the differing states of weather act as distinct phases for various 
actions. Second, the timeline also shows that a great deal of effort is put into preparing 
for severe weather before it approaches during the majority of the year. Similar 
observations were made by Spinney and Gruntfest (2012) and Nichols (2012) for 
emergency managers and university officials, respectively. 
This general timeline acts as a supplement to the individual descriptions of 
actions taken by each deci sion maker. It is a compilation of the behavior of my 






ca e, the individual decision making process varies from case to case, and often 
dev iates from this timeline. 
Rationale for Sources Used: Trust and Familiarity 
The descriptions of the individual cases include the sources the parti cipants used 
(portrayed in Figure 8). What has not yet been discussed is the rationale behind why 
these users used the sources they did. Several reasons include trust, credibility, 
accuracy, and convenience. 
Several of the participants mentioned using local meteorology programs, 
including universities, as a main source of severe weather information because they 
trusted them as credible sources. All of the participants except one expressed a large 
degree of trust in the NWS. Several of them still used alternative sources, such as 
transportation directors or safety and communication directors, because they felt like 
they had a closer bond with them than with the NWS. A key component of whether 
school district officials trusted their sources was that the relationship was on a more 
personal, than professional, level. 
This need for a personal relationship to build trust is evident regarding television 
broadcasters. Several of my participants mentioned having a great deal of trust in their 
local broadcasters who were familiar with their local area. Besides trusting their local 
broadcasters, another reason why school officials used the television as a main source of 
weather infonnation is because the television relays infonnation in a simple manner. 
Most of my participants were not weather savvy and not trained in meteorology or 
weather spotting. Therefore, they appreciated when the television broadcasters would 




that the NOAA websites and radar were too difficult for them to fully understand 
without prior knowledge of how the weather works (one was not even sure what 
websites he used) . 
"l think it [NOAA 's site] makes a lot more sense for meteorologists, for me 
personally it is probably hard to decipher and figure out exactly you know what 
they have posted on their regular radar. But again our local news station has a 
rather attractive Doppler radar that they have set up that I personally find a little 
bit easier to interpret." 
- Technology Director from District F 
Another reason why the television was an effective resource tool was that it 
provides more localized spatial information than the weather radio or the NOAA 
websites. The superintendent from District C emphasized that she appreciates when the 
broadcaster starts big and then gets smaller, specifically pinpointing their location in 
relation to the storm. A participant from District F said that their local station "is within 
a mile of our district border and they have weather people I trust." The desire for more 
detailed spatial information will be discussed in a later section on weather infonnation 
preferences. 
NOAA weather radios were used by all of the participants, yet there was a vast 
difference of opinion regarding the radio 's benefits. Most participants did not have any 
complaints about the radios, while others blatantly expressed their dislike for them. For 
some, weather radios were the first indication that there was a tornado warning. For 
others, it was merely a source of verification. For example, the technology director from 
District F stated, "to be very candid, I would much rather. .. like to know that the 
weather radio is there as a backup because if a tornado has just taken down cell service 
we ll that's not go ing to help us very much for text service . . . " Other participants 
mentioned the rad io's benefits when it was turned on and working. One principal 
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mentioned that their radios were not functioning properly at the time of the warnings. 
Two participants hated weather radios: one superintendent from District F does not like 
electronic voices and would much rather read the text instead of li sten to it, and the 
other, a superintendent from District C, does not like how vague the radios are when 
providing spatial location. She mentions, while laughing, " .. . I don't know if it's the 
radio or ... if it 's the weather service but every time there's a 'This is the National 
Weather Service from Wakefield, VA and I'm going where the hell is Wakefield?" 
I made two observations about how the sources used differed according to job 
title, location, and experience with severe weather. Only two participants mentioned 
looking at radar, one of which being a superintendent from District A, which is an area 
that is frequently hit by tornadoes. He understood weather, including how to interpret 
radar, better than the other participants in less tornado-prone areas, signifying the 
important of past experience and location on information sources and perception. This 
participant also mentioned looking out the window as an essential source of weather 
information. 
Larger districts tended to employ people in additional positions, such as a 
director of transportation services and director of safety and security, who played major 
roles in information gathering and dissemination. These roles that are more explicitly 
designated with weather preparedness responsibilities used alternative sources such as 
NWS scanners, police radios, and teletypes sent from the police department. The 
director of transportation services from District D refen-ed to broadcasters as "not an 
official source, " prefers using the NWS, and serves on an emergency management 
committee. The superi ntendents, principals , and others who fe lt less knowledgeable of 
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severe weather communicated as often as they could with transportation directors and 
others who were more weather savvy. This is a di sadvantage for smaller di stricts with 
limited funding to hire additional staff with des ignated emergency responsibilities. 
The reasons for why officials chose the sources they did are individualistic. 
Each weather information user thought about the event in a different way. Rationali zing 
why certain sources were chosen depends on a variety of factors, including di strict size, 
district location, officials prior experience, and stonn intensity, to name a few. It is 
crucial that weather tool developers recognize this disparity in user needs and 
responsibilities, and begin to think about how to tailor future warning products in a way 
that can best support sensitive weather decision-making. 
Hypothesized Model of Decision Making 
Meteorologists and others often say that certain public responses to tornado 
warnings are irrational. According to the theory of bounded rationality, irrational 
decisions do not exist. No one intentionally makes a bad choice. In their minds, their 
decision is completely logical. Their decisions are the result of a complex decision 
making process that integrates many factors that affect them personally and these 
factors vary from individual to individual. People rationalize the decisions they make 
and actions they take by assessing the situation at hand. Many non-weather related 
factors influence how an individual responds during a hazardous weather event. This 
holds true for school district decision makers based on my research. 
While interviewing school di strict officials, I noticed that a host of factors , 
usually not related to weather, influenced the decisions they made. It was never a simple 




affected how he or she carried out their procedures. Because non-weather factors played 
such a vital part in understanding how school officials made decisions, I created a 
model that illustrates the hypothesized process for action impl ementation under the 
influence of these external factors (Figure 10). This is an iterati ve model occurring 
across the entirety of the severe weather event. lt represents how a single deci sion is 
made and action implemented by a single decision maker. The processes are repeated 
multiple times throughout the severe weather event as the situation evolves, new 
decisions are made, and other actions are taken. Multiple people could be going through 
this hypothesized model simultaneously, such as the superintendent, a principal , and a 
teacher, for example. 
The components of each box vary between districts and are depend on the 
specific situation at the time of the severe weather event. Each box is discussed 
separately and the discussion includes examples of stories and quotes directly from my 
participants. I will then explain the relationship among all the boxes that ultimately lead 
to an action being taken through use of several additional examples. The remaining 
chapters will be "quote heavy" and participant views will be described collectively since 
many of them experienced similar non-weather factors and described related feelings 
when confronted with these challenges. There are five categories of external factors that 
influence what decisions are made (the middle box): plans/procedures, weather 
information, situational awareness, knowledge/experience, and 





Figure 10: Modeled hypothesis of the non-weather related factors influencing 
school district official decision making and action implementation during tornado 
warnings (Nichols and Hoekstra 2012). 
The backbone of every decision is what is written in the di strict's plan . Every 
district participant prepared some sort of document that listed the procedures for severe 
weather safety and sheltering. These documents were prepared in advance of the storm 
and were discussed among the staff at district meetings. The level of detail varied 
among districts and the plans rarely included "what ifs" and ways for dealing with 
unanticipated challenges. Decisions were based on prewritten plans, but changed as 
other factors were introduced. One technology director believed (though was unsure) 
that their procedures were only designed for when students are in buildings, with no 
plans addressing what to do if a warning is issued during evening activities or periods of 
transition, times when students are most vulnerable. Regardless of external factors , if a 
warning was issued, the majority of participants followed their severe weather plan and 
sheltered students. 
The top left box refers to weather information. Questions that the decision 
makers might ask themselves regarding this category are: Does it affect my campus( es)? 
When will the storm arrive? How intense will it be? The answers to these questions 




north of the distri ct, then the severe weather plan of decid ing to shelter students may not 
be fo llowed (a lthough the storm is still carefu lly mon itored). In thi s case, however, most 
di stri cts chose to make students and staff in every school take shelter regardless of 
where the warning was in the di stri ct and what the weather was like. One principa l did 
not have a te levision in hi s office because he thought that it did not look good fo r public 
relations reasons. The lack of televi sion limited hi s sources of weather info rmation. 
Weather infonnation also feeds into situational awareness. A decision maker 
considers factors including the time of day, the location of students and staff, and if any 
students or staff are exposed to danger during the time the warning is in effect. All 
participants mentioned the time of day and location of students as being added 
challenges to an already high-stress situation. A prominent issue mentioned by all of my 
participants was the connection between warnings issued in the early morning when 
students were on school busses or at bus stops. Participants in all the di stricts who 
experienced warnings during this crucial transition period mentioned this as their 
biggest concern, while those who did not experience morning warnings mentioned it as 
being a potential issue in the future. 
"The biggest problem for us is when it hits, and if it hits right in the middle, like 
7 in the morning, 7:30, when busses had already left and students are at bus 
stops, that's when we have our problem. It 's not as much of a problem if all of 
our students are in school. If bad weather 's going to hit during di smissal time or 
during arrival time in the morning, that 's the biggest problem for us." 
- Communication and Public Relations Officer from Distr ict D 
" they haven't been in the morning like thi s. That' s what made this unique ... 
And that' s what created more of a situation that we weren ' t prepared for in 
terms of kids being at bus stops and busses being out in the street and j ust the 
timing of it, you know had thi s occurred you know an hour earlier, we could ' ve 
put the breaks on all our bus routes , but our busses were already unde1way, kid 
were already at bus stops at 7: 15, so that was a un ique problem that we have 
never encountered before here." 
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- Transportation Services Department Director from District D 
" ... it' s almost a catch-22. You can tell the bus drivers well stop picking up 
children and go to some place safe, but you have elementary kids who are out at 
bus stops so you have no way to alert families that you 're no longer picking up 
in that quick of a time period. Or you can continue on your run and picking up 
kids but you're driving your busses in the area of a tornado warning." ' 
- Superintendent from District F 
Several others used expressions such as, "not ideal," "unique situation," "presented 
problems," "biggest concern," "challenge," "weren't prepared for," "what l worry the 
most about," "alarn1ed," and "worst possible time for any school system," when 
describing the difficulty of warnings being issued in the early mornings when busses are 
running or during lunch times. 
Three participants directly asked me what they should do about busses on the 
road during a warning in the future, asking questions such as, "Well, what can you 
do?", "What should we do?", and "What do we do ... ?" This is a concern on which 
many participants, if not all, would "love to have some expert guidance." Most "don't 
know if there is any solution ... " and when asked what they do about kids waiting at bus 
stops, one superintendent simply replied," ... I don ' t know the answer to that." Another 
participant from District D somberly said," ... we were just keeping our fingers 
crossed," after deciding to continue picking up students on busses during the warning, 
highlighting the reality that they truly were not aware of the best practices regarding bus 
safety during tornado warnings. 
However, even knowing the right course of action might not be enough in rural 
districts, such as in District C where a superintendent said, " . .. high profile vehicles 
sitting in a parking lot, God, that's not safe . .. we are rural and so there are places where 
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if a bus driver had to shelter their kids somewhere, there wouldn't be anywhere." 
Clearly, the time the warning is issued raises concern among school di stri ct officials 
si nce it detennines where students and staff are located, which can be anywhere from 
on busses to on a fieldtrip. lt is at these locations, when students are not in the 
classrooms, that make them the most vulnerable. During the decision making process, 
the level of awareness that the decision maker has of their situation influences what 
decisions they make and actions they implement. 
The bottom left box of Figure 10 refers to the decision makers' knowledge and 
experience. Factors included are knowledge of weather, knowledge of special events on 
or off campuses, an understanding of the district location and its possible limitations, 
decision maker previous experience, and how recent events affect how decision makers 
perceive the waming(s). Their level of knowledge of the campus and where students are 
located modifies how situationally aware they are. 
Nearly all the participants were not highly knowledgeable of weather or trained 
in meteorology. Although many of them have degrees of higher education, they have 
not had much, if any, meteorological education. I found that this was a major 
determinant in how confident they were in interpreting weather data. They felt 
responsible to make important decisions, however, they were uncertain as to how to do 
that successfully based off of infom1ation with which they did not feel comfortable 
interpreting. Most "were trying to make the best decision that [they] could based on not 
being severe weather experts" leaving some to "fumbl[e] [their] way through it. " 
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:, 
A technology director from District F mentioned the added comp lications of an 
actual event to those of a drill , since they are left to assess the intensity of the weather 
situation themselves instead of being fed information by the person leading the drill : 
" When we practice . . . they tell us here's what's happening. They say ' you ' re 
under a tornado warning, or thi s is happening, begin your procedures' ... no one 
was telling us exactly what to do [during the actual event]. We were sort of at 
the mercy of trying to interpret the warnings to the best of our knowledge . .. " 
- Technology Director from District F 
This is an excellent example showing that the actual act of sheltering students is not the 
difficult part for school district officials. The complications arise in having to interpret 
the meteorological data and status of the storm. Thus, although the participants are 
given huge responsibilities of ensuring the safety of their students, they are given 
relatively no guidance on how to actually determine if action needs to be taken in the 
first place. 
Several behavior studies have shown that having experienced a disaster in the 
past makes people more likely to prepare for disasters in the future (He ller et al. 2005 ; 
Mulilis et al. 2003; Norris et al. 1999; Sattler et al. 2000; Siegel et al. 2003). The 
participants in Missouri, a state more often hit by tornadoes than the other states in my 
study, were more prepared for tornado threats, especially when it came to the frequency 
of district-wide tornado drill s perforn1ed. When asked if previous experience with 
tornado warnings was helpful , a superintendent from District A replied with , "every 
situation you learn more about what would be an appropriate procedure to follow ... " 
Participants who had less experience with tornadoes tended to feel more stressed 
and anxious about the si tuation : "the fact that a warning was issued for our town wa 
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alarming," and it "caught us off guard ," since "that doesn' t happen here." A 
Pennsylvania principal from Distri ct F fe lt simi larl y: 
" .. .I 'm guess ing in Oklahoma where they' re very common, maybe it sort of 
lessens the impact because they are so typica l. l think the fact that they are rare 
for us definitely adds and err of 'wow we can take this very seriously. ' So not to 
say 1 wouldn ' t take it seriously ifl heard them all the time, but yeah I think it 
probably psychologically sounds more threatening if it 's not someth ing that you 
encounter everyday." 
- Principal from District F 
I could tell whether the person I was interviewing was from a tornado-prone 
area or from an area where tornadoes are more rare. Participants in Missouri, fo r 
example, spoke of tornadoes as a common occurrence, a part of life, while those in 
Pennsylvania were overly shocked and found the warning experience to be 
overwhelming and chaotic. Previous experience, even if it is just growing up in severe 
weather areas, played a part in how the decision makers I interviewed perceived and 
thought about the tornado warnings. 
Similar to previous experience changing the mindset of participants, recent 
events played a major role in how they felt about the situation. I interviewed on two 
severe weather days, both occurring soon after large tornado outbreaks . The following 
expressions came up several times throughout the interviews pertaining to how the 
recent tornado events affected the officials interviewed: "heightened awareness," 
"concerned," "on edge big time," "extra care," and "affects your thinking." A director 
of safety and security from District B expanded further by saying, "so yeah after that 
Joplin tornado, I'm definitely even more aware, concerned, than even when I was 
before. l think that's true of our whole di strict." Other comments included: 
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" It caused everybody to take it more seriously. I noticed an aura of additional 
concern and seriousness in the demeanor. Now we always try and make sure 
everyone's taking it serious anyway, and they do, but thi s was j ust a level above 
that. lt really was, I noti ced that very very clearl y. Not really fear, but concern. 
And wanting to do everything according to the rules, both teachers and kids . J 
mean everybody was very focused." 
- Superintendent from District B 
"I hate to say it ass isted in more of the awareness. They [the students] obviously 
were aware of the stonns and the damage that was occurring and how quickly it 
can occur .. . that assisted in the immediacy and knowing the severity and 
seriousness of what could potentially happen .. .I think having seen the 
devastation I think it was taking it much more serious[ly) ... I think as we always 
should learn from other situations ... and our own as well and it actually assisted 
us [in] being prepared for that and having a heightened awareness if you will." 
- Assistant Superintendent from District E 
On the other hand, the technology director from District F, stated that he 
believed the likelihood of a similar event to occur of that magnitude again was not 
likely: " ... and I think maybe the statistical side too, maybe my logical techy brain 
probably figured wow that was a real major outlier, you know that ' s not gonna happen 
again or something . . . " Although there are mixed opinions, the majority of pa1iicipants 
believed that recent deadly tornado events made them take the situation more seriously. 
District locational factors influenced decision making. One superintendent from 
District C highlighted the significance of living in a rural area and the associated 
limitations. She said, "we have no internet in the west end of the county . .. The power 
goes out here a lot. .. and so if you have high winds or rain, and your power goes out, 
you have no idea what 's coming. And that is always a concern here." People in the rnral 
area surrounding this district do not own televisions and there are no sirens. When l 
asked her how people then become aware of a tornado warning, she simply rep lied, 
" they don' t. " She mentioned that hav ing a longer lead time could aid in making parents 
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and others aware that there is a warning via a phone ca ll from the district office, since 
" that might be the onl y warning that they get." Locati on is thus a huge determinant 
affecting the sources used and decisions made during severe weather. Those in more 
rural areas are often faced wi th limitations and forced to work with less information. 
Responsibilities/capabilities are additional fac tors that influence warn ing 
perceptions and behavior. This category includes questions such as: What are my job 
requirements? What am I responsible for? Am I at full or diminished capability? What 
is my reputation? Am I being perceived by parents and other employees the way that I 
should be? Knowledge of the school, situational awareness of everyone it encompasses, 
as well as previous experience helps determine responsibilities and measures the 
capability of officials to successfully perform their jobs. Having experienced a tornado 
warning in the past, for example, might ease the official 's mind in knowing that they 
were capable of working through a similar situation in the past. 
These five categories: plans/procedures, weather information, situational 
awareness, knowledge/experience, and responsibilities/capabilities all influence the 
decision that is ultimately made. However, unanticipated factors may ari se that either 
automatically alter the action that is implemented, or force a new decision to be made. 
Some examples of unanticipated factors include staff that are not where they are 
supposed to be, staff that are unfamiliar with plans (i.e. where to shelter students), and 
technological failures. A superintendent from Distri ct B said , "If you lose your landl ine 
and your ce ll phone, that gets very difficult. .. ," especially if this were to occur at the 
beginning of the warning when communication between all employees is at its peak. 
The director of safety and security fro m Distri ct B actually did lose cell phone 
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coverage: "Usuall y I try to call my secretary via cell phone. But that day it worked fine 
until oh probably 20 minutes into it the phone system had some issues so l couldn ' t get 
through with ce ll phones. I had to use the computer in my car." An unanticipated factor 
such as a technologica l issue fo rced a new decision to be made, such as fi nding 
alternative methods of communicating. 
Another example of an unanticipated factor that occurred after the decision was 
made to shelter students is a principal who misinterpreted a message sent from the 
central office. The central office suggested that her specific school was in the path of 
the stonn and that she should take immediate shelter. However, she misunderstood him 
and continued believing that her school was safe. Due to thi s unanticipated 
misunderstanding, this principal did not shelter students. This district planned to debrief 
about communication issues such as this one during a district meeting that would be 
held in the weeks after the event. This unanticipated factor led directly to an action, or 
lack thereof, to be taken, which was not sheltering students, even though it was not the 
most appropriate action to be taken in this case. 
A rather entertaining unanticipated factor occurred to an assistant superintendent 
from District E: 
"One that I had to laugh about though was in the middle of the first or second 
warning when I was still trying to contact all the buildings, I had a news reporter 
call, and wanted to speak to the person making those calls if they had time to 
call and hadn't even contacted all the buildings yet..." 
- Assistant Superintendent from District E 
On the phone, he sounded surpri sed by the idea of someone thinking it was appropriate 
to call a school dur;ng the warning. I am impressed by the reporter 's dedication, but 
concerned for his manners; he lacked any situational awareness. 
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The fo llowing examples ti e the entire hypothes ized decis ion making model 
together, illustrating the re lationship between specific decisions made and contributing 
ex ternal fac tors using real-li fe stories: 
Example 1: 
" ... even though the gym now we have learned engineering-wise is not the elite 
place to go, the other reason I did that [shelter students in the gym] first thing in 
the morning and may do it in the future is my teachers aren't on duty yet, 
contractually, so that first thing in the morning we only had about 10 adults to 
supervise about 1,000 kids. We needed them in one location because that could 
create more problems than the possible damage from a tornado if the kids are 
just running loose all over the place." 
- Principal from District D 
Even though this principal had the knowledge and experience that gyms are not 
the safest location to shelter students in, he made the decision to shelter them there 
anyways since he was situationally aware that he had limited staff and diminished 
capabilities due to it being in the early morning. In this case, he acted against nonnal 
procedures because he thought unsupervised students in more appropriate shelters 
throughout the campus were more vulnerable than supervised students in a less safe 
shelter. 
Example 2: 
"So typically for our plan . .. it'd be the superintendent or his designee .. . [the 
person responsible for activating the plan] ... [The superintendent] was nearby 
but I believe he was wrapped up in another meeting or dealing with another 
situation . I couldn ' t even tell you , l don ' t believe that he was even within ear 
shot at that point. Looking back at it now . . . that morning was extremely chaotic 
for us . . . the third warning in particular was troublesome ... And it was all sort of 
nebulous because ... we fe lt. . . the verbiage of the warning was made di fficul t for 
us to make some decisions. You know with that third warning, with him not 
being right there [the superintendent] , [the secretary] and l tried to at least 
guide . . . one of the buildings that we fe lt was based on the warn ing was 
potenti all y in the path of the storn1 .. . we fe lt that at that point it's probably best 
for them to consider pulling the trigger on that [advi ing them to take shelter]." 
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- Technology Director from District F 
This participant recognizes that in their pl an, the superintendent ha the role of 
lead decision maker. However, in this scenario, thi s director and the secretary were 
faced with an unanticipated factor when the superintendent became unavailable to make 
the decision of whether or not to shelter students. He knew that he then had to take on 
the role of decision maker, yet hi s lack of weather knowledge made it di ffic ult to 
interpret the weather information he was receiving about the third warning. He knew he 
needed to act fast, though, and so by being situationally aware of the location of the 
students and knowledgeable of his campus in relation to the approaching storm, he was 
able to make the decision, with the help of his secretary, to advise the building they 
perceived as being in the highest risk to begin taking shelter (action implemented). 
Example 3: 
"Because it was dark, I could tell there was a little storm system, but it wasn't 
even raining when I left the house. So on the radio I heard coming in that we bad 
a watch. Okay, no big deal. We don't have to put our plan into affect but it 
means to be on high alert. So I was here maybe 20 minutes when the phone first 
rang from central office that said they just issued a tornado warning. Okay, so 
then we got all of our students as they got off the busses, which was the most 
dangerous thing they did ... we put them into the gym because obviously there 's 
no glass, the gym is in the middle of our building. So we did that, the tornado 
warning was lifted, sent them to class, it went back into affect and then we were 
in communication with my director and the director 's secretary and it was like 
alright phase 1. .. of the plan is absolutely in affect." 
- Principal from District D 
This principal had enough knowledge and experience with tornadoes in the past 
to be familiar with how a "stormy" sky appears. He states that hi s plan will only be put 
into effect when a warning is issued, and no procedures are fo llowed during the watch. 
The central office was responsible for relaying that a warning has been is ued to each 
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indi vidual schoo l. From this weather information, they made the decision to take 
students off of busses and shelter them in the gym (action). He had situational 
awareness that busses were not a safe locati on, while the gym was a safe shelter since it 
was free of windows. 
Figure 10 was des igned to show how situationally aware the decision maker was 
to his or her surroundings played a huge part in determining how he/she responded. The 
components of this model match those included in the situational awareness model that 
Endlsey created in 1995 (Endsley 1995; Figure 2). Every event is different as external 
pressures arise that may unexpectedly change what decision is made. It is therefore 
important to have a plan that can be modified at a moment 's notice to account for these 
changes. Perry and Lindell (2003) and Tierney (1993) state "that preparedness is a 
continual process, while preparedness plans are a snapshot in time. They show that 
plans must be living documents that take into account changes in resources and 
vulnerability." One participant said, "you can' t have a plan that addresses every 
contingency," implying that changes to the plan have to be made as issues arise; " it has 
to be sort of that days call based on the time that all this occurs." 
Weather Information Preferences 
The final section of the interview asked participants about the types of weather 
information that would help them in their operations and decision making. I asked them 
to rank four different categories of weather information di ssemination types from most 
to least prefen-ed. The types included probabilisti c infonnation, more deta iled spatial 
specifi city, a time frame for storm arri va l and departure, and a longer lead time. As the 
partic ipant ranked the categories, they di scussed their reasoning behind their final 
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ra nking. Asking them to rank thei r preferences fo rced them to ta lk about the advantage 
and disadvantages of each in compari son with the other types. I fo und it very useful in 
pinpointing what they thought was helpful , not helpfu l, and why. This section is also 
described collecti vely, as many of the participants shared similar ra ti onales of weather 
information preferences. 
The two categories that the participants most desired were more spatial 
specificity and a time frame for stonn arrival and departure. Although most mentioned 
that a longer lead time is helpful, they tended to rank it lower than having more spatia l 
information and a specified time frame. More on participant thoughts on current and 
extended lead times will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Above all else, participants wanted to know if the stonn was going to affect their 
campuses. To school district decision makers, safety of their students is their number 
one priority, and knowing whether or not their campus will be impacted is the number 
one preference for these officials in order to detennine impacts and give advanced 
notice to their populations. The technology director from District F said, " ... knowing 
where it will be, even if it doesn't materialize, is probably the single most important." A 
principal from District D said that he would "absolutely" rather know more specifically 
where the warning is than have a longer lead time. 
Because school districts are so spread out throughout the di strict and since 
school officials tend to lack weather training, it becomes difficult fo r them to know 
whi ch schools will be affected. Several expressed the need for "more clearly defined 
boundari es," to allow them to more easi ly detennine which schoo ls in the district are at 
highest ri sk. Beyond just being affected, di stri ct officia ls fo und it nebulous as to which 
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areas were even being warned. A superintendent from District F asked a hypothetical 
question to his local forecasting office, "What do you mean by [ street name]? What do 
you mean? ... " Similarly, the director of safety and security from Di strict B was 
confused about the wording of what areas were warned: 
" ... the National Weather Service issued a tornado warning for ... the southern 
part of our county and not the northern part ... now comes the question, are we 
considered northern, are we considered southern, where are we at? ... we've got 
schools kinda in the middle of the county. So l think ... they should define a 
tornado warning from ... [city name] south or from [city name] north , you know 
use some kind of city." 
- Director of Safety and Security from District B 
These are just a few of the examples of the participants regarding their confusion to 
determining which areas were under warnings. 
As mentioned above, school district officials sometimes rely on external sources 
other than NOAA websites and radios to gather information about the storm. Often, 
these external sources are individuals, either trained meteorologists or weather-
interested people, with whom they have created a personal relationship. The assistant 
superintendent from District E said that his local broadcast meteorologist specifically 
singled out certain elementary schools that were likely to be hit by the storn1. This 
allowed him to give a heads-up to those students and prevent worry: 
" ... [the broadcaster] was actually mentioning our elementary schools that they 
were hitting ... it didn't change the process but so many times when you feel so 
vulnerable in that situation, knowing that okay heavy rains are coming, so that 
you could let kids know, especially at the elementary level you know you're 
gonna start hearing pounding on the roof, heavy rain is coming and you know 
that 's going to happen, as opposed to it just happening and then them getting 
upset and trying to explain." 
- Assistant Superintendent from Di trict E 
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These personal relationships were useful to school officials by providing localized 
intensity information that they could not have otherwise obtained from websites and 
radios . 
Even if the warned area was known, several of the participants were not sure if 
they should activate their severe weather plans for the entire district if only one area of 
the district/county was under a warning. For example: 
"So one of the questions that I ask, that I ask you, is there a zone from which we 
should activate, do we activate it in [ city name] even though we have schools 
that are 20 minutes south? Do you activate it for your whole district? Do you 
activate it for the region? 5-mile radius?" 
- Superintendent from District F 
Others were simply unsure as what to do: 
" .. . to get a high level of precision on where those storms are is sometimes really 
tricky, and it does raise the question, well, does the entire district, especially 
with such a large school district like ours, do we put maybe the northern end of 
the district into sort of an emergency procedure mode when only the southern 
end of the district is being impacted? ... it became very clear very quickly that 
this is entirely gray .. . we don't have an answer for that yet, we're struggling 
through that." 
-Technology Director from District F 
Without knowing the "right" answer, some played it safe and made the entire district 
take shelter, while others singled out certain schools and kept the remaining schools on 
high alert. School district officials need guidance from their weather forecasting offices 
when deciding which schools need to take shelter. 
Most participants mentioned the importance of having a time frame of stom1 
arrival and departure in addition to more spatial specificity. They want to know when 
their specific schools will be impacted. The director of safety and security from District 
B thought that knowing the time frame would allow the staff to know when to be 
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especially attentive. Similarly, a superintendent from the same school di strict said that it 
would help his principals know when to be on highest alert, and when to start lunch: 
" lt would help me communicate with the principals exactly when they need to 
be on the highest alert and whether or not they should start lunch . If we know 
that we know it' s going to hit ri ght at lunch time, maybe they delay lunch. Or 
maybe they speed up lunch . If that 's accurate, maybe we make some 
adjustments to those time periods in the school where kids are less supervised ." 
- Superintendent from District B 
The majority of participants agreed that spatial specificity and time-specific information 
go hand in hand, and that both are preferred during severe weather scenarios. 
The type of weather information that was least preferred was probabilistic 
information, which is interesting since WoF is based off of probabilities. Many 
participants found that probabilities did not provide that much information about the 
storm, since people "bear that [probabilities] so often for everything ... " The 
superintendent from District B said, "that's not very helpful to me, because I don ' t care 
if there is a 10% chance." Participants much rather preferred detenninistic information, 
meaning they wanted to know whether or not the stonn will come. For example, the 
superintendent from District F candidly stated, " ... either tell me it 's gonna come or not. 
It's nice to know we have a higher percentage but I'm going to put everyone on alert 
that there 's a 60%, but I really need to know whether I need to evacuate students in 
other spaces." 
With that said, a benefit of probabilities is that it calls attention to potential 
storm activity in the near future . The director of tran portation services from District D 
said, " l mean l think probability is something that you might get in advance, much more 
than an hour in advance, or maybe a day in advance or something. And it' s important to 
give us an alert that that situation could occur." Simi larly, the a sistant superintendent 
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from Distri ct E agreed that it gives an alert, however, adds that trusting a certain 
percentage is tri cky and there are added complexities that may lead to more problems: 
"That l would see as just a heightened awareness. That would have been 
beneficial had the preceding days, events, not occurred, so it didn ' t catch us by 
surpri se. But saying there is 60%, that 's kind of like here when we hear 60% 
chance of snow, or even when we hear I 00% chance of snow, and then call 
school delays the night before and have nothing the next morning and take all 
the heat for canceling school." 
- Assistant Superintendent from District E 
Participants in this study overall felt that probabilities were of lesser value to spatial and 
temporal infonnation. 
Some other weather preferences mentioned by specific participants include a 
desire for text alerts and verification that storm spotters have seen a tornado. Also , 
visuals, such as a localized map of the area with the storm path, would be helpful. As 
mentioned earlier, broadcasters that mentioned a specific school is helpful in making 
the school officials take notice. Lastly, for those under several warnings, they would 
prefer one long warning rather than several warnings with five minutes in between; 
transporting students back and forth between shelters and classrooms is time 
consuming, and becomes chaotic with such a short time period between warnings. 
Thoughts of Current and Extended Lead Times 
When participants were asked what they thought of the current average tornado 
warning lead time of about 13 minutes, most said that it 'gives [them] plenty," or 
"ample time" to take shelter. Most felt comfortable to put their plan into effect in that 
time period, noting, "everything can happen between that period of time . .. " Some did 
mention that 13 minutes is adequate for sheltering students who are in classrooms, but 
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that a 13-minute warning during tra nsition periods wo uld be more difficult. However, 
most parti c ipants also did mention, " the more time the better." 
Thi s sentiment quickly changed once I in troduced the idea of Wof and its 
associated extended lead times. Initi al fee lings were those of amazement, confusion, 
and doubt. The technology director from Distri ct F shouted, "Rea lly? One to two hours? 
Seriously?" Another participant was hesitant, as he "would have to see how accurate 
this technology is ... ," and others deemed it " impossible." Once I briefly explained the 
new system and its future possibilities, and as they began to give thi s new rea lity more 
thought, their initial response of more lead time as being beneficial changed to include 
some negative implications that would accompany longer warning times. 
" . . . Sometimes, too much information can almost be problematic." This was a 
common response among participants. They brought up several negative points 
associated with longer lead times . These are responses based on hypothetical questions, 
and may not prove to be true in an actual case of a longer tornado warning lead time. 
First, many would anticipate a substantial increase in the number of parents corning to 
pick up their children, and in the number of parent phone calls to offices . Assisting 
individuals via the telephone is respected among the staff, but my participants did not 
view attending to hundreds of parents in a small time span as realistic . 
Second, some participants were concerned that students taking shelter for that 
long a period would result in loss of class/instructional time: 
" It may be a littl e bit of a di straction to the learning environment if everybody 
knows that we ' re on high alert ahead of time. You want those kids to be focused 
on their school work, unless we know sornething ' s going to happen or at least 
there's a likelihood of it. So it might be a li ttle bit of an issue to keep kid on 
task." 
- Superintendent from Di strict B 
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Similarly, a few officials thought that it would be diffi cult to keep students, especia ll y 
the younger students, busy for that length of time. The superintendent from District A 
mentioned," ... taking cover for two hours is really not feasible," while the technology 
director from District F said he "would not want to have small children in sort of like a 
protective position for an hour. . . " 
Third, several participants expressed concern that increased lead time would 
lead to less accuracy in the warned area and an increase in false alarms. A few 
mentioned that false alarms tend to make people pay less attention to the warnings. The 
superintendent from District A said, "I recognize that there is a balancing act because 
greater lead time will also probably lend itself to inaccuracy, and too many false 
warnings we know result in people not paying attention to all of the warnings, the 
legitimacy of warnings." Another participant also shared his concern with false alanns, 
saying, "and that would be my fear if we did it too much earlier is you may get some 
non-complacents, or people that are not listening, not taking it serious." 
Fourth, many of these officials thought that such an extended warning lead time 
reduced the urgency of the situation, and "wouldn't be as much of a crisis mode as it 
would be you know just an emergency." Several school officials admitted that they 
would not take action until well into the warning. In fact, the director of safety and 
security from District B said if" ... they're issuing a warning an hour in advance, we got 
20 to 30 minutes before we need to really take this serious. Where now, as soon as a 
warning is issued, they know it's imminent... we need to take it serious. " The 
superintendent from District C shared similar feelings when she aid. " .. .if we had an 
hour warning, we wouldn't immediately go into position at the beginning of that hour. 
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Yeah we would probably start moving to position maybe a half an hour or twenty 
minutes ... [We would] review the plans [for the first half an hour]. " 
This is no different than officials taking immediate action with the current 20-
minute lead times; nothing has changed except for having extra time before taking 
shelter. An assistant superintendent questioned whether or not he should take shelter 
right away or wait and monitor the sky. Additionally, most believed that extending the 
amount of warning time would not actually change the actions they would take during 
the warning. The director of safety and security from District B alluded to an extended 
warning being similar to a watch, giving them a heads up that severe weather is 
approaching. Other than acting as a "pre-warning," this director feels that an hour lead 
time serves little purpose. 
Although participants voiced several concerns regarding longer lead times, they 
also mentioned significant benefits. The superintendent from District C said, "the more 
time we can get, the more confidence I have that we can get everybody where they need 
to be." Another major benefit is having more time to make decisions. A technology 
director states that they need the time for the decision making component of the 
warning process, not for the actual physical act of sheltering students: 
"I think the decision making part and communication pieces are where we need 
the time. Actually implementing the plan, our buildings are quick, I mean, 
they're very quick. I think it's the decision and the decision making process 
getting as much lead as possible and then time to disseminate those decisions is 
where it would be beneficial." 
- Technology Director from District F 
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He later adds that it " ... would give us time to digest, to begin to look at questions, to 
begin to say, ' okay do we have all the facts right now?' 1t would give us a lot of 
decision making power. .. lt would give us the ability to better respond. " 
The majority of participants also mentioned that longer lead time would give 
them more time to review plans with staff and faculty to ensure that everyone was fully 
prepared and knew what to do. A principal from District D sa id , "it would give us more 
time to ... have everybody pull out their plan and review it, and be completely clear on 
what to do, and know where the risk spots are ... " Ideally, this should be taken care of 
long before the warning is even issued during plan preparation as a part of faculty 
meetings. More time would also allow for the superintendents, or those in charge, to 
more thoroughly relay information to other employees and schools and provide more 
specific instructions: 
"If we had an hour to two hour lead time, I could have discussed it with the 
assistant superintendent, the elementary coordinator, and we could've been 
much more focused in issuing more clear directions to buildings. We found out 
when it was issued, so we were almost in a reactive mode rather than a proactive 
mode." 
- Superintendent from District F 
"I don't think it would've changed what we did, but it would give us more time 
to communicate and to do it more effectively, and to be able to provide more 
explanation to people what was going on. It would've been nice, it would give us 
more time to quickly meet as the staff and decide what we were going to do . We 
didn't have a lot of planning time, we were kind ofreacting. So, if we had a little 
bit more time, we would've been able to coordinate our efforts I think a little bit 
better." 
- Conununication and Public Relations Officer from District D 
Many participants felt that they were forced to react to the warning infonnation without 
fully assessing the situation; more time would thus provide the time to proactively 
decide what is best with more confidence. 
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Another benefit of longer lead times is hav ing extra time to consider delaying or 
canceling school , afternoon activities, assemblies, and/or sporting events; to "re-factor 
[the] entire afternoon schedule." 
" ... the longer lead time helps us know whether or not we should send kids home 
at the end of the day, or. .. it would be very helpful during sporting events , field 
trips, things that are outside of the school bui ]ding, making a decision whether 
or not to have those events. That's when kids are most vulnerable, when they're 
not in the building ... " 
- Superintendent from District B 
"Well given that the first warning was issued at 7:15 , if we had notification two 
hours earlier at 5: 15, we would have an opportunity to delay or close schools for 
that day. The more advanced notice we have the more ability we have to react 
and do what's in our estimation the safest thing for kids, which is what we're all 
about." 
- Director of Transportation Services from District D 
More thought could be placed on weighing the pros and cons of delaying, canceling, or 
canceling school or events. Current lead times do not provide sufficient time to plan for 
later in the day. 
The participants shared their thoughts on increased lead time, providing several 
reasons for why it may, or may not, be valuable . Above all else, all the participants 
recognized that the implementation of WoF will force them to modify existing plans 
and change their current system. There is much uncertainty among this group of 
decision makers as to what an increased lead time will entail. The assistant 
superintendent from District E cautiously stated, "yeah that would drastically change 
what we do ... We'd really have to think through that one, and it would ce1tainly change 
the way we prepare for this. " Several participants expressed the need for guidance from 
meteorologists on how to successfully shape their cuITent plans to adj ust to increased 
time : 
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" . . . we'd certainly have to think through that and look to the weather folks and 
the emergency management response people on what the recommendation 
would be for di stricts if we had that lead time, how to effectively use that lead 
time." 
- Assistant Superintendent from District E 
Relation to Other Research 
Several other studies found similar results regarding how longer lead times 
would impact ce11ain populations. Call and Coleman conducted a winter weather study 
of school officials and found that closing school due to weather di srupted learning and 
decreased test scores due to less instructional time (Call and Coleman 2012, 
forthcoming). Additionally, Nichols (2012) and League et al. (2012), who conducted 
studies of university emergency managers and state emergency managers, respectively, 
found that too much lead time makes the situation "lose the emergency status." The 
results from these studies can help shift the mindset of weather tool developers from 
thinking of tornado warning lead times as only a 13-minute window to a weather 
information continuum that spans several hours. 
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I I 
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis showed how K-12 school district decision makers made weather 
sensitive dec isions during severa l Spring 2011 tornado warnings. There were numerous 
similarities in how they prepared for the severe weather and preparations were taken 
long before the warning was issued. The majority of the participants were aware of the 
approaching severe weather. Non-weather factors , such as time of day and location of 
students, influenced how they perceived the event, but it rarely changed what they 
actually did. If a warning was issued, participants followed their severe weather plan 
and sheltered students and staff. Unlike the Mileti response model, responses in this 
case were stimulus-driven and environmental cues that mattered in several other studies 
did not influence the decision of whether or not to shelter students. 
Participants expressed an interest in having more localized information to know 
which schools within the district will be impacted. Thoughts on extended tornado 
warning lead times were mixed: some thought too much time would make the situation 
seem less imminent and dangerous, while others felt that extended lead time would also 
allow more time review plans and communicate with others in the district. Knowing the 
potential effects of extended lead time and influence of external factors on decision 
making for school district decision makers provide evidence of how these specific 
school officials use weather information to make decisions dming tornado warnings in 
the context of their specific complexities and circumstances. User needs vary and a "one 
size fits all" approach will be ineffective. 
This project is part of a new body of research that is trying to change the 
equation from a top down research-to-operations process to a more grass roots, 
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operations-to-research process. Figure I] is a graphic that was developed by SSWIM 
researchers that shows the collaboration between different stakeholders. All groups 
should work together throughout the process in iterative ways. Meteorologists and 
software deve lopers should not create new technologies solely because the science and 
technology allows the advancements. Instead, new advancements should respond to 
expressed needs of the publics, for whom the products are initially intended. 
Figure 11: SSWIM-developed graphic of stakeholder collaboration and 
communication. 
79 
CHAPTER 7: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FlJTURE RESEARCH 
There are several topics that future researchers conducti ng studies on K-12 
school di strict decision maker behavior could consider. They include: 
I) lncluding a "pre-survey" that participants fill ed out in order to find out how 
much they knew about their local geography and NWS products before the 
interview. Such a survey would also have given me a more thorough idea of 
their past experience in their job and with tornadoes. 
2) Focusing on school officials in one region. This would allow more direct 
comparisons of how experience influenced actions could have been made. 
3) Expanding the project to go beyond just tornadoes to include how school 
officials use weather information to support their decisions for all types of 
hazardous weather events. 
4) Focusing on one school district and all types of weather. This would allow 
the researcher to see how consistent the participants are in their actions 
through a variety of conditions and sets of warnings. A future study on 
school district officials should include a metric for considering if/how fal se 
alam1s affect decisions and actions. 
5) Using sample warning days that are not right after a recent tornado outbreak. 
6) Interviewing more pa1iicipants. The results from this study serve as 
hypotheses that future researchers can test for comparison . 
7) Using Google Earth , it was clear that in some ca es not all the schools within 
the di strict were under a tornado warning (see Figure 12 for an e 'ample). 
Participants in thi s study were not ure if they should make all the cho l 
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take shelter even if certain ones were not under a warning. Future research 
hou ld ask the question: Would improved warning pecifi city make it ea ier 
fo r them to make only the chools under the warning take shelter? 
Figure 12: District C under a tornado warning on April 281\ 2011. The blue dots 
indicate the approximate locations of schools in this district. Note that one school 
was not under the tornado warning. This participant made students in aU schools 
take shelter, regardless of whether or not they were under a warning. 
8) Exploring the degree to which the different types of "shelters" used by the 
participants reduced their student and staff vulnerabili ty. 
9) Observing the participants in person when the districts were under warning . 
This would add depth that is not possible through the telephone post event 
interviews. For example, for the participants who thought the ituation, a 
chaotic, being on site would have allowed me to witness how that mind et 
translated to real-life behaviors. 
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I 0) Obtaining more detailed spatial and temporal infonnation of the ituation 
would have been idea l, once again empha izing the benefit of being on ite. 
A gap in the study is that 1 did not know what the weather was like during 
these warnings since it played little part in the decision making of the 
participants. Future research should include an anatomy of a close-up view 
of a storm, the warning, and a di strict to further explore all the components. 
Here is a list of other more general suggestions for future researchers doing 
projects that focus on decision making of certain groups during severe weather: 
1) What people say they would do and what they actually do usually are 
different. An advantage of this study is that I asked administrators what they 
did, and not what they said they would do . This is part of a new trend in 
social science of moving away from perceptions research to studying actual 
behaviors and the motivations behind them. 
2) Using qualitative interviews. I obtained rich detailed infonnation from my 
participants and I recommend that future studies also rely on qualitative 
interviews. Using quotes provided the perspective of the pa11icipants using 
their own words. 
3) Taking a step back to consider big picture topics : how do the public and 
different stakeholders perceive a warning? How do people define a warning? 
Future research should assess what a warning means to people. What do 
people actually do during a tornado warning and before a tornado warning i 
issued? This study shows that a warning is closely associated with 
imminence and immediacy. What do you call the information that 
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sc ientifically may be available by 2020 that indicate that a tornado may 
happen 2 hours from now? According to my participants it would not be a 
warning using the 20 12 definition . The following quote howcases that the 
superintendent from District C clearly did not think of an hour "warning" as 
an actual warning: 11 Now if we had an hour, and knew we were going to 
have a warning, we would be able to make sure that everybody was off the 
road if anyone was on the road ... it wouldn't be as much of a crisis mode as it 
would be you know just an emergency." This superintendent implied that the 
greater than one hour lead time would provide would not be her warning. 
Rather, she expects the warning to come later when the situation becomes 
more imminent, which is when a warning should be given. Another 
participant, the director of safety and security from District B, also alluded to 
the disconnect between warnings and lead time: " I don ' t think a warning 
needs to be issued until it's imminent." 
4) Reevaluating the meaning of lead time. Lead time is defined differently 
according to the user group and is not the same as the NWS definition. 
Taking protective action is not confined to the space of the lead time as 
defined by the NWS, but decision making, preparations to take action, and 
some actual actions, are taken before the warn ing is issued . The warning 
tends to act as a trigger to begin the sheltering process . Much preparation is 
taken well in advance of the warning, which in the minds of school 
administrators constitutes tornado warning lead time. Re earch should 
investigate what people are doing with the time that they have now, looking 
83 
beyond just the warning and re-conceptualize the idea of lead time to take 
into account all the actions that are taking place to prepare for the event 
across the entire spectrum of Lime. This study shows that some stakeholder 
do see time along a continuum where the warning is only one short 
component. 
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CHAPTER 8: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TH E WARN 0 
FORECAST PROJECT SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS 
Now is the time to bring in the perspective of stakeholders while WoF is in the 
early stages of development. It is important to find the ways tha t WoF can 
accommodate these findings to make its research most usefu l to weather sensitive 
decision makers. WoF should be developed in a useful and meaningfu l way and not just 
focused on technological advancements. WoF must ensure that social science remains 
an integral component as WoF progresses. The integration of the customer 's 
perspectives and opinions is integral to creating systems with the most potential to save 
lives and property and meet the original mission oftbe NWS. The development of Wof 
products that extend lead time for storn1 warnings is underway. One goal of my thesis is 
to show WoF how certain stakeholders understand warnings in order to info nn the WoF 
research process. 
The following are recommendations to WoF: 
1) Future research should clarify how WoF fits into the current continuum of 
weather inforn1ation along temporal and spatial scales. How will it fit in with 
current outlooks and watches? 
2) WoF developers need to continue to work closely with varying takeholders to 
understand their weather info1mation needs. They need to listen to stakeholders. 
These collaborations need to be at the fo refront of WoF research. 
3) New terminology is required. As l briefl y discussed in the future research 
section , we are unsure as to how stakeholders and the public perceive the tern1 
warning. Preliminary observations arc that a "warning" i clo ely affiliated with 
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imminence and immediate danger. A two-hour lead time may not register the 
same feelings of dread and concern as the current 15 minute lead times. 1 
therefore suggest that a new name be created as WoF evolves and develops. A 
possible interpretation of the product might be more simi lar to an enhanced 
watch than a warning. 
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Appendix A: Acronyms 
~n-" - ' ij Integrated Warning System JWS 
Iowa Environmental Mesonet lEM 
National Incident Management System NIMS 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration NOAA 
National Severe Storms Laboratory NSSL 
National Weather Service NWS 
Protective Action Decision Model PADM 
Social Science Woven Into Meteorology SSWIM 
Storm Prediction Center SPC 
Weather Forecast Office WFO 
Warn-on-Forecast WoF 
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Appendix B: Interview Script 
interview Debrief 
He llo! My name is Stephanie Hoekstra. Thank you so much for agreeing to 
participate in this study. I reall y appreciate it. 
As l explained to you in the email , the purpose of this study is to learn more 
about how schools (K-1 2) use weather infonnation to make decisions during severe 
weather warnings, as well as to understand what information yo u wo uld like as a school 
decision-maker. I am asking for your involvement in particul ar because you had some 
part in the decision making process during thi s past tornado warning on XX Month. I 
anticipate this interview lasting about one hour. 
Great, we can now start the interview. [Start recording and conduct interview}. 
Interview Questions 
Planning 
1. What position do you hold at your school? 
a. How long have you held this position? 
2. Does your school conduct tornado drills? 
a. If yes, how often? 
3. Does your school have a severe weather plan? Jfyes, can I have a copy of it? 
a. Does your school have a separate tornado plan? 
b. Who is responsible for activating the plan? 
i. Is there a back-up person to activate the plan? 
c. What is your role in the tornado plan? What responsibilities do you 
have? 
4. Who is in charge of monitoring the weather at your school? 
a. Who, if anyone, usually pays attention to severe weather that may 
happen days ahead of time? 
b. Who keeps an eye on developing situations on the severe weather day? 
c. How long have they been doing this job? 
d. Have they undergone severe weather spotter tra ining? 
Onset of Tornado Warning - Situational Awareness 
Think about the event on XX- Month, 2011 .. . 
5. How did you learn that there was a tornado warning for thi s area? 
6. What sources did you use to get that weather info nnation - how and who? 
(National Weather Service, TV, NOAA weather radio, Emergency Manager, 
phone call , etc .) 
a. [ff uses the National Weather Service} What level of trust do ou have in 
the NWS to provide you with usefu l and accurate infonnation? 
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b. /Jfuses a specific person within the NWS} When did you start using the 
assistance of a NWS employee for obtaining weather information and 
making decisions? Did he/she approach you or did you ask the WS for 
the extra ass istance? Do you find him/her helpful ? Do you pay fo r this 
service? 
c. [if uses an emergency manager} Since when have you used an 
emergency manager to help you obtain information and make deci sions? 
Do you trust what the EM says? Do you find hi m/her helpful ? 
d. [If Other} Who? 
7. Approximately what time did you learn of the warning? 
8. Where were you and what were you doing at that time? 
9. On the day of the warning, were there any circumstances that hindered yo ur 
ability to get the weather information you needed related to the eventual tornado 
warning? 
a. What was the situation? For example, were you outside/in a staff 
meeting/in the cafeteria/in class? 
b. Did this influence what actions you took? 
c. Did it delay the implementation of any action plans? 
10. After learning that the school was under a warning, what thoughts went through 
your head? What were your priorities? 
Actions Taken During Duration of Warning 
11. Once you knew your school was under a tornado warning, what did you do? 
Walk me through the minute-to-minute steps that you took. Do you mind if 1 
create a timeline when you describe what you did? 
12. Who made the decisions during the warning? ls it just one person or did multiple 
people make the decision? 
a. [If one person} How long has this person been making the decisions? ls 
this job listed in their job description? 
b. [If more than one p erson] What is the chain of responsibility within the 
school and school district? 
13. How did this information get relayed to all faculty/staff/students? 
14. What is your relationship with the students' parents during a tornado warning? 
a. Did you notice a difference in the number of phone calls/ parents driving 
to school? If so, what did/do you do to manage that? 
15 . Were there any extracurricular or sport activities going on at the time of the 
warning? 
a. How did you notify those who were outside that there was a warning? 
b. What is the protocol during such a situation? 
c. Did you follow the protocol during thi s past warning? 
History with Tornado Warnings 
16. Have you had previous experience with tornadoes or tornadoes warning ? If o, 
what were they? 
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Preference /Lessons Learned 
17. Did the weather information you received help you to execute your chool 's 
plan for what to do in this past tornado warning? If yes , how so? 
18. Was there any informa tion you obtained that was particularly useful? If so, what 
and why? 
19. Do you fee l that the information you received about the tornado was clear? 
a. Was there infonnation that could have been communicated more clearly? 
How so? 
20. Was there anything about the information that you received that made you feel 
particularly alarmed? 
21. What are your thoughts on the current tornado lead-time ( or warning time) of 
about 13 minutes? Do you feel like that is adequate time for taking appropriate 
action? 
[Currently, a possible new method ofpredicting tornadoes is being researched. With 
this new method, tornadoes may have an extended lead-time, or warning time, of 
between one and two hours. One objective ofmy study is to assess how a longer lead-
time would impact schools.] 
22. Would a longer lead-time change what you did during this past warning? If so, 
what would you have done differently? How would the time line we created 
earlier change? 
a. [If yes} Do you feel like you would use the extra time efficiently, or 
would it be more of a hindrance? 
23. If given, say, a one-hour warning, would you anticipate any of the following? 
a. Keeping students busy for that length of time being an issue? 
b. Loss of class time being a concern? 
c. More parent phone calls (automated phone outs)? 
d. More parents coming to school to take their students home? 
a. Could you imagine orchestrating mass pick-ups of students? 
24. I will now provide you with several examples of specific weather infornrntion. 
On a scale from 1 to 5, how would you rank the following options as being 
beneficial, according to your personal preferences (with I being least beneficial 
and 5 being most beneficial)? 
1. Probabilistic infonnation 
Example: You hear that there is a 60% chance a tornado 
could come through the area where your school is 
located. 
11. Spatial infonnation 
Example: You are provided with a map of the anticipated 
storm path. 
111. A defined time frame for storm arrival 
Example: You are provided with a spec(fic time when the 
storm will start and end in your area. 
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1v . A longer lead-time 
Example: You now kno w one hour ahead of time that 
tornadoes may be imminent in the area where your school 
is located. 
25. ln an idea l situation, what weather informatio n would you want? 
Looking Ahead 
26. As a result of thi s tornado warning, is there anything that you are planning to 
change or would like to change in the future about your school's plan during a 
future tornado warning? 
a. lf yes, do you feel like there w ill be any barriers to impl ementing these 
changes? 
27. Is there anyone that you think played a role in thi s past warning that you would 
suggest I interview? 
28. Do you have any further comments about your experience that you would like to 
share? 
[Stop recorder}. That concludes the interview. Thank you so much again for 
participating! If you have any more questions about anything, please don ' t hesitate to 
get in contact with me. 
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